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PICKET LINE OBSERVANCE AS A PROTECTED

CONCERTED ACTIVITY
TomAs R. HAGGARDt
The labor picket line is a curious phenomenon. It is simultaneously
the exercise of an inalienable right' and a reprehensible conspiracy to
coerce 2 -depending, of course, on one's perspective. But both perceptions of the picket line are founded on rather strong personal convictions.
The picketed employer, quite naturally, views the picket line with
all the affection an Inquisition heretic might have harboured toward a
garrote. Those who would do business with the picketed employer and
are confronted with the picket line, directly or vicariously, often feel
a sense of outrage at the affrontery of those who would interfere with
their "right" of economic intercourse. But the emotions run even
higher on the other side of the spectrum. However insignificant or
unmeritorious the underlying grievance, the picket line converts it into
a "cause" that transcends the immediate dispute. Observance of the
picket line-any picket line-is venerated as a fundamental tenet of
union morality.3 Retribution often goes beyond mere name calling."
Given the aura of intense emotion that exudes from the picket line,
it is not surprising that this is the context for much of the labor violence that exists today.5
t Professor of Law, Rutgers-Camden Law School; B.A., University of Texas,
1964; LL.B., University of Texas, 1967.
1. Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
2. See W. HurrT, THE STRmE-THREAT SYSTEM (1973).
3. See L.A. Young Spring & Wire Corp., 70 N.L.R.B. 868, 874 (1946) ("It is
almost a rule of trade union ethics for one labor union to respect a picket line established by another.").
4. Apart from the physical violence which is frequently visited upon the disreSpector of picket lines, see note 5 infra, unions may impose substantial fines upon their
members who are guilty of this particular infidelity. See generally NLRB v. Boeing
Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973) (holding that the National Labor Relations Board does not
have statutory authority to assess the "reasonableness" of fines imposed upon union
members who cross the picket line during an authorized strike); Johannesen, Disciplinary Fines as Interference With Protected Rights: Section 8(b)(1)(A), 24 Ik. L.J.
268 (1973); Comment, Union Power to Discipline Members Who Resign, 86 HARV.
L. REv. 1536 (1973).
5. While I have not done an exhaustive or scientific study of the problem, the
cases summarized in BNA, LABOR RELATIONS CUMULATIVE DIGEST & INDEX TO THE
LABOR RELATIONS REFERENCE MANUAL, §§ 57.58, 57.939, suggest a proportionately high
incidence of violence in the picket line context. Other studies, equally impressionistic
and non-comprehensive, tend to support this conclusion. NATIONAL COMM. ON THE
CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, REPORT ON VIOLENCE IN AMERICA, ch. VIII

(1969); E. SCsmIDT, UNION Pown AND THm PUBLIC INTEREST 111-31 (1973).
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The law, of course, condemns picket line violence as such.0 Beyond that, the respective rights and duties of all concerned are somewhat obscure. This is unfortunate. It is the purpose of this article to
examine how the law has dealt with certain aspects of this highly emotional problem. Specifically, the article will examine the circumstances
under which an employee's refusal to cross a picket line is, and should
be, a "protected concerted activity" under section 7 of the Labor-Management Relations Act.
L"

SECTION

7 AND THE MUTUALITY REQUIREMENT

A. An Introductionto Section 7
In combination, sections 7 and 8(a) (1) of the Labor-Management Relations Act enable employees to engage in organizational and
"other concerted activities for. . . mutual aid or protection" free from

the interference, restraint or coercion of their employer. 7 Section 7
has always been something of an enigma.8 The legislative history indiexcellent, in-depth studies of union violence in two specific strike situations see S. PETRO,
THE KiNcsPoRT STRmIE (1967); S. PETRO, THE KOHLER STRum (1961).
6. A union commits an unfair labor practice if it is responsible for picket line
violence. Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(b) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A)
(1970); see note 5 supra. Moreover, state law remedies are generally available for
most types of picket line violence. See generally C. MoRis, THE DEVELOPINO LABOR
LAw 794-97 (1971).
7. Labor-Management Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) provides that
Employees shall have the right to self-organization .*. . to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
Id. § 8(a) (1) provides that "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 7."
8. For a general discussion of the history and evolution of section 7 see Cox,
The Right To Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J 319 (1951); Getman, The
"Protectionof Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 1195 (1967). Refusals to cross picket lines, as a specific form
of section 7 activity, has been a popular topic among law review writers. See, e.g.,
Carney & Florsheim, The Treatment of Refusals to Cross Picket Lines: "By-Paths and
Indirect Crookt Ways," 55 CORNELL L. REV. 940 (1970); Getman, supra at 1205-10;
Kennedy, The "Right" to Refuse to Cross a Picket Line: Limitations Imposed by Courts
and Legislation, 2 ST. Louis U.L:J. 66 (1952); O'Connor, Respecting Picket Lines:
A Union View, N.Y.U. 7TH CoNF. ON LAB. 235 (1954); Petro, National Labor Policy
and Respect for Picket Lines, 3 LAB. L.J 83 (1952); Schatzki, Some Observations and
6uggestions Concerning a Misnomer-"Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TExAs L.
REv. 378 (1969); Thatcher & Finley, Respect for Picket Lines, 32 NEB. L. R V. 25
(1952); Note, Picket Line Observance: The Board and the Balance of Interest, 79
YALE L.J.'1369 (1970).

19741

PICKET LINES

cates little more than the purpose of the section-to nullify the common
law conspiracy doctrine as it had been applied in restraint of union activities9 and to thereby counter-balance the economic power of employers. 10 Except for obvious references to the right to strike,1" there are
no specific indications of which "concerted activities" Congress intended to protect. From this ambiguous statutory predicate, section 7
case law has grown in a somewhat disjointed fashion; each specific type
of activity has simply evolved its own sui generic criteria of legality,
without any apparent regard to an underlying premise common to all
types of section 7 activity. Despite this, one can nevertheless abstract
from the cases certain recurring fundamental principles. Thus, while
this article will ostensibly focus upon the specific legal criteria of the
"refusal to cross a picket line" adjudications, the broader section 7 perspective will not be ignored.
B.

The Various Types of PicketLines and the Evolution of the
"Mutuality" Justifications

The related concepts of "concertedness" and "mutuality" are of
critical, but frequently unheralded, importance to any section 7 case.
The section only encompasses "concerted activities

. .

for mutual aid

and protection" [emphasis added]. But with whom must an employee
act in concert, or to whom does the concept of mutuality extend, in
order to bring the activity within the ambit of section 7 protection?
In answering this question within the context of refusals to cross
picket lines, one must differentiate between three distinct situations,
each involving a different relationship between the picketers and the
employees who honor the picket line (hereinafter frequently referred
to as "honorers"). First, there is the picket line set up by an employment group of which the honorer is a member; for example, when
the
honorer is in a bargaining unit represented by the union that is maintaining the picket line. Secondly, there is the picket line established
by employees who merely have an employer in common with the hon9. See Local 232, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245
(1949). "The most effective legal weapon against the struggling labor union was the
doctrine that concerted activities were conspiracies, and for that reason, illegal. Section
7 of the National Labor Relations Act took this conspiracy weapon away from the
employer in employment relations which affect interstate commerce." Id. at 257-58.
10. See H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); 78 CONG. REc. 3443
(1934) (remarks of Senator Wagner).
11. See authorities cited note 10 supra. Section 13 of the Act, indeed, specifically
protects the right to strike. Labor-Management Relations Act, § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163
(1970).
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orer; for example, when the honorer is the member of one union and
another union is picketing their common employer. Thirdly, there is
-the picket line around the premises of an employer for whom the honoring employee does not work.
(1)

Single Employer Picket Lines Set Up by the
Honoring Employee's Union
The law applicable to this first situation is the easiest to state.
The employee who refuses to cross such a picket line is simply regarded
as a striker, with all of the rights inuring to whatever type of striker
he happens to be.' 2 He is acting in concert with his fellow employees,
for the mutual benefit of the employment group of which he is a member.
(2) Picket Lines Established by Employees Who Have an
Employer in Common with the Honorer
In this second situation, the rights of the honorer have also been
resolved with a fair degree of consistency by the Board and the courts.
An employee who refuses to cross a picket line set up by fellow employees, even though he is not represented by their union in collective
bargaining, is entitled to be treated in the same manner as the picketing employees.'3 In this situation, however, whether the picketers and
the honorers are acting in concert for their mutual aid or protection is
debatable.
The Board's early decisions in this area lack explicit rationale; it
was simply assumed that all the employees of a single employer enjoy
the requisite mutuality of interests. For example, in Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,' 4 the members of one union were on strike against Bell.
Other Bell employees, who were represented by a union of their own,
refused to cross this primary picket line and were discharged by their
employer. The Board held that this was protected concerted activity
and that the employer was in violation of the Act. On the mutuality
12. See, e.g., NLRB v. John S. Swift Co., 277 P.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1960); Carter
Carburetor Corp. v. NLRB, 140 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1944).
13. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir. 1972); Virginia Stage
Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 499 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971);
NLRB v. Difco Laboratories, Inc., 427 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Southern
Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Montag Bros., 140 F.2d
730 (5th Cir. 1944); Wheeling Elec. Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 218 (1970); Lenkurt Elec.
Co., 177 N.L.R.B. 259 (1969); Cooper Thermometer Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 502 (1965);
Club Troika, 2 N.L.R.B. 90 (1936).
14. 88 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1950), enforcement denied, 189 F.2d 124 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 885 (1951).
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issue, the Board merely stated that "the general concern of employees
with mutual aid and support in their efforts to improve their working
conditions, even when not directed to the immediate achievement of
economic benefit for themselves, has long been regarded as such a protected interest."' 5 In neither this case nor the ones cited for this proposition did the Board advance any justifying rationale for this conclusion.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the Board's finding that
the refusal to cross the picket line of another union was a protected
concerted activity. The court was, first, unwilling to concede that the
refusing employees had acted in "concert" even among themselves. 16
Secondly, the court considered their conduct analogous to a "wildcat
strike," and thus unprotected under the Act.' 7 The real thrust of the
court's opinion was, however, that these honorers of -another union's
picket line were not acting for their "mutual aid or protection."
Rather, "it could have only been for the benefit and aid of those in
a different bargaining unit, the representatives of which could not have
represented the involved employees and, consequently, could have obtained nothing from respondent for their benefit.""'
Undaunted by Illinois Bell, the Board continued to protect the refusals of employees to cross the picket line of their fellow employees,
despite separate union representation. Two justifying rationales for a
finding of "mutuality" soon evolved. The first theory of "mutuality"
assumes that if the employees of Union A, by virtue of concerted activities, are able to extract a -wage increase from the employer, benefits
will indirectly inure to their fellow employees who are members of
Union B and that, therefore, by acting in concert the two groups are
each acting for their mutual aid or protection. For example, in Cooper
Thermometer Co. the Board stated that "the possibility is more proximate that improved conditions for the production employees might
lead to a reciprocal effect on the office employees' own conditions."'"
The second theory of "mutuality" also relates to economic benefits, but more directly to the efficacy of the picket lines. The theory
is that if the employees of Union B respect the picket line of Union
A, this will both enhance the efficacy of Union A's strike, resulting in
greater benefits to Union A employees, and also obligate Union A em15.
16.
342 U.S.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 1176.
NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 189 F.2d 124, 127 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
885 (1951).
Id.
Id. at 129.
154 N.L.R.B. 502, 505-06 (1965).
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ployees to honor Union B's picket line, enhancing the efficacy of
Union B's strike which will inure to the economic benefit of Union B
employees. This view was most eloquently stated by Judge Learned
Hand in the oft-quoted Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates case.20
He indicated that when one worker is aggrieved and other workers go
out on strike for him,
[t]he rest know that by their action each one of them assures himself, in case his turn ever comes, of the support of the one whom
they are all helping; and the solidarity so established is "mutual
aid" in the most literal sense, as nobody doubts. So too of those
engaging in a "sympathy strike," or secondary boycott; the immediate quarrel does not concern them, but by extending the number of those who will make the enemy of one the enemy of all,
the power of each is vastly increased. 21

The economic and philosophical predicates of these two rationales
have gone virtually unchallenged, 2 and are now firmly ensconced in
the case law that consistently holds as "protected" an employee's observance of a fellow employee's picket line, despite the fact that they are
represented by different unions.
(3)

Picket Lines Around the Premises of an Employer for Whom
the Honoring Employee Does Not Work

The third picket line situation-an employee honoring a picket
line around another employer's premises-has caused the most difficulty for the Board and the courts. Unfortunately, scant attention has
been paid to the theory of mutuality which underlies the decisions.
In Cyril de Cordova & Bros.,2" the first case in which the Board
was confronted with this situation, the Board held that the employee's
refusal to cross the picket line was a protected concerted activity for
which he could not be discharged, but only the trial examiner discussed
the mutuality issue. He indicated that the employee "had a substantial
and legitimate interest in the successful prosecution of the strike against
the Exchange [the other employer], not only because of his union membership [the refusing employee was a member of the striking union],
but also because of the possible reciprocal effect improved conditions
in neighboring and associated businesses of like kind might have on
20.
1942).
21.
22.
23.

NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir.
Id. at 505-06.
But see text accompanying notes 225-29 infra.
91 N.L.R.B. 1121 (1950).
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his own future conditions of employment."2 4

In short, the trial ex-

aminer merely expanded the first rationale discussed above.
With one exception,2 5 in the remainder of the cases of this type,
the mutuality requirement is treated summarily, if at all, by reference
to the Hand rationale of reciprocal assistance 2 -- an unfortunate lapse
of administrative and judicial analysis. The emphasis, rather, -has been
on the development of guidelines for testing the legality of such
refusals. To a large extent, the case law in this area reflects a reactionary interplay between the trial examiners, the Board, and the courts
2
that can be best understood by means of a chronological presentation. 7
II.

A CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CASE LAW DEALING
WITH AN EMPLOYEE'S REFUSAL TO CROSS A PICKET
LINE AT ANOTHER EMPLOYER'S PREMISES

In addition to mentioning the "mutuality" issue, the de Cordova
decision is significant in several other respects; indeed, the trial
examiner's opinion contains a more complete discussion of some of the
theoretical arguments than can be found in most of the subsequent decisions.
The employer in de Cordova had argued that the refusal of this
employee to cross a picket line during the regular course of his employment was in essence a "partial strike"-a form of concerted activity that
had consistently been held to be unprotected against employer discipline.2 The trial examiner, however, rejected the argument by distinguishing the two situations on a "shock the conscience" basis. He
construed the "partial strike" and "slowdown" cases in terms of conduct
"so 'indefensible' as to overcome the presumed intent of Congress to
sanction it"29 -a characterization that he said was not applicable to
24. Id. at 1135.
25. One recent case dealt with the question of whether the mutuality requirement
is satisfied when the honorer of a picket line is motivated solely by a fear of picket
line violence. Overnite Transp. Co., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 87 L.R.R.M. 1120 (July
23, 1974) (Overnite IV). See Part IV C infra.
26. See, e.g., NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d 111, 113 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1952), affd, 345 U.S. 71 (1953); Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1546
n.5 (1962), af'd sub nom. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
27. Since the law with respect to the first two picket line situations is fairly stable,
the remainder of this article will focus exclusively upon this third situation-where an
employee refuses to cross a picket line around another employer's premises.
28. See, e.g., NLRB v. Blades Mfg. Corp., 344 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965); NLRB
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946).
29. Cyril de Cordova & Bros., 91 N.L.R.B. 1121, 1136 (1950).
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mere picket line observance.30
In support of his conclusion that a refusal to cross picket lines was
a protected concerted activity, the trial examiner also relied on the
proviso to section 8(b)(4). 1 Ostensibly, this proviso exempts from
the secondary activity prohibitions of section 8(b)(4) the refusal of
employees to cross certain picket lines. Though not literally applicable
to a section 7 case, this proviso was construed by the trial examiner
as reflecting the view of Congress that an employee's refusal to cross
a picket line was "not unjustifiable from the point of view of public
policy. '32 The trial examiner, moreover, concluded that "it would be
absurd to say that a union may lawfully induce or encourage employees
to refuse to cross a picket line . . . , and yet simultaneously say that
employees who refuse to cross are subject to forfeiture of their rights
under the Act."3

Actually, there is nothing at all "absurd" about making such a
statement. The simple fact that Congress expressly chose not to make
an activity illegal does not necessarily mean that Congress therefore in-

tended to make it a protected activity.3 4 It is more likely, rather, that
30. The trial examiner rhetorically noted that
Here we do not have a situation where employees, foregoing the traditional
methods available to them to bring economic pressure to bear upon their employer, deliberately choose and then pursue while remaining at work, a tactic
. . that is deliberately calculated to flout managerial authority and plant discipline to force their end ....
[Rather, the employee] utilized a conventional method, time-honored in the history of the American labor movement,
and one, moreover, that was the only practical means available to him for
that purpose.
Id. (emphasis added).
31. Section 8(b)(4) generally makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to
engage in what is generically called "secondary activity." The proviso to that section
reads as follows:
Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to
make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any
employer (other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer
are engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such employees whom such employer is required to recognize under this subchapter.
Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(b) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1970).
32. 91 N.L.R.B. at 1137.
33. Id. The Board, while it generally adopted without modification the trial examiner's opinion, declined to engage in any speculation with respect to the relationship
of the proviso to a section 7 picket line observance case. The Board merely noted
that "it is at least clear that it [the proviso] places no proscriptions on the activity
here before us." Id. at 1122.
34. In essence, the trial examiner in de Cordova was saying that because picket
line observance was expressly declared by Congress not to be illegal, this also implies
that it is protected concerted activity. The illogic of this reasoning was expressly noted
by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
There the employer argued the converse of the above proposition, to the effect that
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Congress intended to adopt a posture of total statutory neutrality toward
the activity. This means that while the employer is not entitled to the
assistance of the law in stopping the activity, the employees are also
not entitled to the law's protection when the employer resorts to the
self-help remedy of discharge.
In any event, having thus held that a refusal to cross a picket line
was a protected concerted activity, the trial examiner introduced a
qualifying concept that has played a significant role in the evolution of
the law in this area. Despite the fact that the honorer was protected
against discharge, the employer was not left helpless in coping with employee attempts to remain actively employed while refusing to perform
certain work. Rather, the employer was privileged to require the refusing employee
either to perform all his work as instructed or to assume the status
of a full striker by quitting work entirely for the period his sympathetic action would have infringed upon part of it. And if Finn
[the employee] chose the latter course, the Respondents lawfully
could have replaced him while he was out, without incurring any
liability to reinstate him if his position was no longer open when he
chose to return. 35
In other words, an employer would have the option of converting a refusal to cross a picket line into a full economic strike, and, so converted,
the activity would be protected only to the extent that economic strike
activity is protected. The Board expressly declined to adopt the trial
examiner's conclusions in this regard;3 6 but this was only a temporary
hesitation. The seeds of a workable analogy had been planted and the
Board was not long in adopting it as its own.
The next case to come before the Board ultimately wound its way
to the Supreme Court. While the potential for helpful clarification was
thus great, the result was an obfuscation that has since haunted the case
law. In Rockaway News Supply Co.,3" a driver refused to cross a picket
line while making deliveries for his employer. He was discharged.
Relying on Cyril de Cordova, the Board held that the driver's conduct
since the activity was unprotected it should also be deemed affirmatively illegal. The
Court replied that "there is little logic in assuming that because Congress was willing
to allow employers to use self-help against union tactics if they were willing to face
the economic consequences of its use, it also impliedly declared these tactics as unlawful
as a matter of federal law." Id. at 495.
35. 91 N.L.R.B. at 1137-38.

36. Id. at 1122.
37. 95 N.L.R.B. 336 (1951), rev'd, 197 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1952), alfd, 345 U.S.
71(1953).
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was protected concerted activity. However, it added this limiting
caveat: "Although Waugh's refusal to cross the picket line was a protected activity, the Respondent, as a normal incident of its right to maintain its operations, could have required Waugh to elect whether to perform all his duties or, as a striker, to vacate his job and make way for
his replacement by the Respondent."' 38 The trial examiner's analysis
in de Cordova was thus vindicated.
The Second Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order. The
court agreed generally that refusals to cross picket lines were a protected concerted activity, since such action "is frequently of assistance to
the labor organization whose picket line is respected, and it is in a broad
but very real sense directed to mutual aid or protection." But the court
disagreed with the Board over the extent to which the right was protected. 39 The Board had held that the right was limited by -the employer's
corresponding right to run his business and thus to force the refusing
employee to assume the status of an economic striker, with all the rights
and liabilities incident thereto."0 The court of appeals, however,
thought that a refusal to cross a picket line was protected in an even
more limited sense; it could not see why the refusing employee should
be entitled to even the somewhat abbreviated rights of the economic
striker. It cogently pointed out that the honorer "had no grievance
against the respondent [his employer] nor any economic demands
against it which a strike on his part might have enforced. '41 The court,
moreover, intimated that a union supported strike in such a situation
would have violated the secondary activity provisions of the Act.42
Thus, the court concluded that the employer was not required to treat
the honorer as a constructive striker, but rather could discharge him
for his conduct.
In what sense, then, is a refusal to cross a picket line a protected
concerted activity? The court, reasoning by analogy to the labor decisions that permit employers to prohibit union solicitation only during
working time, concluded that an employee should be free to engage
in the concerted activity of refusing to cross a picket line only during
his non-work time.43
38. 95 N.L.R.B. at 337.
39. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 1952),
affd, 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
40. 95 N.L.R.B. at 337. Under NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S.
333 (1938), an employer can permanently replace but not discharge an economic striker.
41. 197 F.2d at 114.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 113 & n.3. If, for example, the employee, in his role as a customer,
refuses to cross a picket line, this would be protected against reprisals from his employer.
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The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, but proceeded
on an entirely different basis. It held that, because the employee's refusal to cross the picket line was in violation of a collective bargaining
agreement, it became unprotected activity and thus the employee was
subject to discharge. 44 Although the Court denied that it was declaring
any "sweeping abstract principles about the respective rights of employer and employee regarding picket lines,' 4 5 some of the Courfts
language has played an important albeit confusing role in the evolution
of broader principles of picket line observance. After quoting the
Board's statement equating an employee who refuses to cross a picket
line with a striker, the Court continued:
The distinction between discharge and replacement in this context
seems to us as unrealistic and unfounded in law as the Court of Appeals found it . . . It is not based on any difference in effect
upon the employee. And there is no finding that he was not replaced either by a new employee or by transfer of duties to some
nonobjecting employee, as would appear necessary if the respondent
were to maintain the operation. Substantive rights and duties in
the field of labor-management do not depend on verbal ritual rem40
iniscent of medieval real property law.
Several interpretations of the Court's language are possible.
None, however, lend any credence to the notion that a picket line observer is entitled to any greater rights -than an economic striker. The
first interpretation would give almost no legal protection to the honorer;
it construes the Supreme Court as saying that discharge will always be
sanctioned in the refusal-to-cross situation because there is a presumption that, if this is done for the nondiscriminatory purpose of maintaining the business operation, the discharge will always be followed by the
immediate hiring of a new employee.
The difficulty with this interpretation is that it assumes the existence of a fact that, as the subsequent cases demonstrate, is not inevitably present in every case-the immediate hiring of a permanent replacement for the discharged honorer. Thus, the usefulness if not the
validity of this interpretation may be brought into question.
The second possible interpretation of the Court's language circumvents this factual difficulty by hypothesizing that the Board's analogy
to -the rights of economic strikers was rejected only in part by the Supreme Court. This view sees the Supreme Court as saying that the
44. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 79-81 (1953).
45. Id. at 75.
46. Id. (emphasis added).
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rule prohibiting the "discharge" but not the "replacement" of an
economic striker4 7 should not be transplanted wholesale into the observance of a picket line context, because a strike and a mere picket line
observance are different in one critical respect. An employee who is
on strike has removed himself from his work premises; if he is a truck
driver he has vacated his employer's truck and is outside the gate on
the picket line. The employer need take no affirmative action visa-vis the striking employees before proceeding to hire permanent replacements. If he does take some action and precipitously "discharges"
striking employees before they are replaced, this may be deemed to have
a coercive impact and thus constitute an unfair labor practice.
The employee who merely refuses to cross a picket line has not
totally vacated his work premises. If, as the Board in Rockaway News
assumed, an employer has the right to have his employees either perform
their assigned work or go on strike, this means that the employer must
take some affirmative action vis-a-vis the employee who refuses to cross
a picket line. Perhaps the Supreme Court was saying only that the words
the employer uses in accomplishing this result should not be determinative. Thus, the employer who says "you are fired" should be treated no
differently than the employer who says "you are ordered to vacate your
truck." This is not to say, however, that the rights of the employee-regardless of whether he was "fired" or "ordered to vacate"-should not be
determined by analogy to the rights of the economic striker. Under this
interpretation he would thus be entitled to reinstatement at any time prior
to his permanent replacement. This interpretation, at least, makes
some sense out of the Court's language.
The third possible interpretation of the Court's language is that
the honorer is not entitled to be treated as an economic striker under
reasoning akin to that used by the court of appeals. This honorer was
even less protected than an economic striker, not because he refused
to cross the picket line during work time as the court of appeals held,
but rather because his conduct was in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. If the agreement is the "context" of which the Court
47. Under NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), an economic
striker who is "discharged" and then permanently replaced is entitled to reinstatement,
because the discharge is an unfair labor practice. But the economic striker who is
merely "replaced" is not entitled to immediate reinstatement at the end of the strike.
The apparent justification for this anomoly is that the affirmative act of "discharging"
a striking employee is both unnecessary (the employer can protect his interests by simply
hiring a replacement) and it has a coercive impact over and above the mere loss of
the job,
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speaks in the quotation being interpreted,4 8 then it is indeed unrealistic

and unfounded in law that a contract violator is entitled to even the
minimal protections of an economic striker. In light of the Court's refusal to generalize over picket line observance, this interpretation is

probably the most plausible.
In the first refusal-to-cross case arising after Rockaway News, the

NLRB trial examiner adopted the first interpretation enumerated
above. The trial examiner in Auto Parts Co.4" noted that "although
there is no direct evidence that ,the complainant herein was replaced,

that would inevitably have been done, inasmuch as he was the only
pickup man."5

He then apparently construed the Supreme Court's re-

jection of the discharge/replacement distinction as indicating a liberalization of the employer's right to discipline picket line honorers (in contrast to economic strikers) and concluded that the employer could treat
the employee's conduct "as insubordination, and in effect -as an attempt
to dictate the terms of his employment. ' 51

The Board in Auto Parts adopted the trial examiner's recommendation that the complaint against -the employer be dismissed, but

declined to adopt all of -the trial examiner's rationale. In lieu thereof
the Board held that there was no evidence of section 8(a)(3) discrim-

ination, 52 that the employee simply refused to do the job he was hired
to do, and that it was immaterial that the employee's
assigned duties which he chose not to perform were in some manner related to the union activities of employees elsewhere or to
[his] own union predilections . . . . However viewed, and simply
stated, [his] conduct was a refusal to do the job for which he had
53
been hired and a direct disregard of his employer's instructions.
48. See text accompanying note 46 supra for the full quotation. Specifically, the
relevant language is: "The distinction between discharge and replacement in this context
seems to us as unrealistic and unfounded in law as the Court of Appeals found it. .. .
Id. (emphasis added).
49. 107 N.L.R.B. 242 (1953) (trial examiner's decision).
50. Id. at 247.
51. Id.
52. Section 8(a) (3) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for'an employer
"by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization .... "
Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). When
an employer singles out a pro-union employee and specifically assigns him a delivery
that entails crossing a picket line, this may amount to a violation of section 8(a) (3).
This aspect of the problem has been emphasized in several cases. See, e.g., Truck
Drivers Local 728 v. NLRB, 364 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Cone Bros.
Contracting Co., 317 F.2d 3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 945 (1963); L.G. Everist,
Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 193 (1963) (trial examiner's decision), rev'd, 334 F.2d 312 (8th
Cir. 1964).
53. 107 N.L.R.B. at 243.

56
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This holding is similar to the reasoning and conclusion of the Second Circuit in the Rockaway News case and was subsequently reaffirmed by the Board in Redwing Carriers,Inc."4 Redwing Carriers was

appealed, but after a change in its composition, the Board moved to
have the case remanded for further consideration.

The Board this time

narrowly construed Auto Parts as merely holding that the employer did
not violate section 8(a)(3) by discharging the employees. The Auto
Parts decision, the Board said, "carefully avoided characterizing such

activity [refusal to cross picket lines] as either protected or unpro.tected."''55 The Board then relied on the Cyril de Cordova case for the
54. 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961), modified, 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, afj'd sub nom, Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905
(1964). This case, however, additionally raised the issue of the relevance of section
502 of the Act which provides that "the quitting of labor by an employee or employees
in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of
employment of such employee or employees [shall not] be deemed a strike under this
Act." Labor-Management Relations Act § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1970). The general
counsel argued that since those who approached the picket line were threatened with
physical violence, they were "protected" by section 501 and that their discharge thus
violated section 8(a)(1). The Board simply found that "abnormally dangerous conditions" did not exist on this picket line and thus it was unnecessary for the Board to
comment upon logical nexus between section 502 and the "protectedness" of section
7 concerted activities. 130 N.L.R.B. at 1209. The legislative history of section 502,
though limited, strongly suggests that Congress intended that the Act was not to be
construed as "compelling" work under abnormally dangerous conditions or as rendering
a refusal to work to be affirmatively "illegal." See I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT oF 1947, at 436, 573 (1948). Thus the
section might conceivably bear some relationship to the Board's power under section 8
(d) to order a union to cease and desist from striking or a district court's power under
section 208 to enjoin strikes that imperil the national health and safety. In the recent
case of Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), the Supreme Court held
that section 502 provides a limited exception to both express (contractual) and implied
(section 8(d)) no-strike obligations. Thus the Court concluded that "a work stoppage
called solely to protect employees from immediate danger is authorized by section 502
and cannot be the basis for either a damage award or a Boys Market injunction." Id.
at 385. Likewise though the discharge of an employee who strikes in violation of a
contractual no-strike clause is normally not an unfair labor practice, it becomes one
by virtue of section 502 if the strike is over an abnormally dangerous working condition.
NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 330 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Knight
Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958). Section
502 would appear to have no other compelling relationship with section 7. Since in
absence of a contractual prohibition the "quitting of labor" over unsafe working conditions would normally be a concerted activity already protected by section 7, section
502 would add nothing, unless the "[shall not] be deemed a strike" language is construed
to mean that the employer is thus to be deprived of his Mackay right to hire permanent
replacements. An "abnormally-dangerous-conditions" strike would be, in other words,
a totally protected concerted activity. A partial legislative overruling of Mackay should
not be inferred lightly, however, and it is more reasonable to assume that Congress
did not intend for section 502 to expand the rights of Mackay strikers. By the same
token, it should not be construed as expanding the rights of picket line honorers beyond
what they would be under a "normal" section 7 type of analysis.
55. 137 N.L.R.B. at 1546.
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proposition "that employees engage in protected concerted activities
when they respect a picket line established by other employees.""6
That, however, was not the end of the matter. Having recognized
a section 7 right to refuse to cross picket lines, the Board then noted
that -the employer also enjoys a correlative right to attempt the continued operation of his business. Balancing these rights, the Board concluded that "where it is clear from the record that the employer acted
only to preserve efficient operation of his business and terminated the
services of the employees only so it could, immediately or within a short
period thereafter, replace them with others willing to perform the
scheduled work,"5t no unfair labor practice is committed. The Board
construed the Supreme Court's decision in Rockaway as merely a repudiation of the verbalistic distinction between discharge and replacement-the second interpretation articulated above, with the caveat that
the termination be under the specified circumstances. The Board in
Redwing found these circumstances to be present and reaffirmed its
dismissal of the complaint against the employer. This decision was af-,
firmed on appeal.58
Redwing Carriers thus attempts to treat the picket line honorer
as much like an economic striker as is permitted by the divergent
factual situations."
In both the strike and the refusal-to-cross situations the employer's hiring of permanent replacements is justified on
the basis of "business necessity." In the strike situation, the permanent
replacement of strikers enjoys a presumption of being necessary for the
continued operation of the business. The presumption can be rebutted
by a showing of discriminatory intent, but apparently not by an actual
lack of compelling business necessity."
The Board in Redwing Carriers implicitly adopted the same kind of presumption with respect to
the hiring of permanent replacements of picket line honorers. The
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1547.
58. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 905 (1964).
59. The Board, for example, makes it clear that the verbalistic discharge/replacement distinction of the law of strike replacements has no place in the different factual
situation of a refusal to cross a single picket line.
60. See, e.g., Gillespie, The Mackay Doctrine and the Myth of Business Necessity,
50 TExAs L. RIv. 782 (1972). "The Mackay Court found as a matter of law that
employers who hire permanent replacements during economic strikes do so because of
legitimate and substantial business needs-protecting their businesses and continuing operations." Id. at 795. The author, however, further concludes that "[s]ince the need
for permanent replacements is far from universal, the Mackay finding is no longer justified. Instead, employers should have to prove their need for permanent replacements
in each case." Id. See also Schatzki, supra note 8, at 382-92.
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Board did not attempt to second guess the employer with respect to
the actual "business necessity" for hiring the replacements.

1

Thus, although in an earlier part of the Redwing decision the
Board had indicated that the "protected concerted activity" aspects and

"discrimination" aspects of picket line observance were separate, 2 in
the last analysis the Board's utilization of the Mackay doctrine and its
emphasis on "purpose" suggests that the discharge or replacement of
a picket line honorer can contravene section 8(a)(1) only in a derivative sense-i.e. when the facts also indicate a violation of the antidis3
crimination provisions of section 8(a)(3).
The next case64 to come before the Board demonstrated, however,

the continued vitality of both the purely section 8(a)(1) aspects and
the distinction between discharge and replacement.

In L.G. Everist,

5

Inc., when several employees refused to cross a picket line in the
course of their employment, they were discharged. Before replacenents could be hired, they asked for reinstatement but the employer
refused.
61. 137 N.L.R.B. at 1548. The Board did re-examine the facts of the case, but
only to the extent of determining that when the employer discharged the honorers he
"did so entirely for the purpose of continuing . . . business operations"; id. (emphasis
added)-a consideration which would appear to be mainly relevant to the discrimination aspects of the case. That this was the employer's purpose was evidenced by the
fact that he immediately "transferred other men from their normal jobs to make these
deliveries, and in addition hired new men to replace them . . . ." Id.
62. This is implicit in the Board's treatment of Auto Parts. See note 52 and
accompanying text supra.
63. Cf. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
"Whatever may be the limits of § 8(a) (1), some employer decisions are so peculiarly
matters of management prerogative that they would never constitute violations of §
8(a) (1), whether or not they involved sound business judgment, unless they also violated
§ 8(a)(3)." Id. at269.
64. Cone Bros. Contracting Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 108 (1962), enforced, 317 F.2d
3 (5th Cir. 1963) was actually the next case. Cone Brothers, however, is a hybrid
of the second and third picket line situations outlined above. Three affiliated companies
were involved, but they were found by the Board to constitute a single "employer."
The employees of one affiliate refused to cross a picket line set up at the premises
of another affiliate. The trial examiner had found that the employer had deliberately
assigned to pro-union drivers deliveries that he knew they would not make because of
a picket line and that the "constructive discharges" were, therefore, in violation of section 8(a)(3). The Board affirmed, and also found the employer's actions to be a violation of section 8(a)(1), which is consistent with the generally accepted law of single
employer picket lines. See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra. The court of
appeals affirmed, essentially on a section 8(a)(3) basis. The court noted that "when
it appears that a discharge of an employee for refusing to cross a picket line is resorted
to out of anti-union animus to get rid of a union sympathizer and not to preserve
the efficient operation of an employer's business, an unfair labor practice in violation
of § 8(a)(1) and (3) occurs." 317 F.2d at 8.
65. 142 N.L.R.B. 193 (1963), enforcement denied in part, 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir.
1964).

1974]

PICKET LINES

The trial examiner, relying on Redwing Carriers, approached the
problem purely from the perspective of section 8(a)(3), noting that
"we must weigh the promptness of replacement as evidence of the need
and desire to continue operations, these in turn bearing on the issue
of discrimination." 6 6 The trial examiner found that the immediate use
of supervisors and the prompt hiring of permanent replacements
evidenced a legitimate need and intent to continue the operation of the
business, 6 7 that the initial discharges were thus lawful, and that the employer had not violated the Act by denying the employees' request for
reinstatement even though such request was made prior to the hiring
As far as section 8(a)(3) is concerned, the
of the replacements.6
reasoning is flawless.
This crystalization of the law along section 8(a)(3) lines was,
however, shattered by the Board. Apparently agreeing with the trial
examiner that section 8 (a) (3) was not violated,6 9 the Board nevertheless found that the employer's refusal to reinstate the discharged employees constituted an interference with their section 7 right to engage
in concerted activities. The Board used the "business necessity" test
to identify the kinds of employer reaction against which concerted conduct is not protected, rather than as a potential refutation of discriminatory motive. The Board then again analogized discharged picket line
honorers with economic strikers. With respect to both, "business necessity" will justify the hiring of permanent replacements, but not the
refusal to reinstate prior to the time such replacements are found. The
Board, therefore, held that the refusal to reinstate was in violation of
70
section 8(a)(1).
The Board's attempt to get the section 8(a)(1) doctrine into high
gear was promptly thwarted by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
which refused to enforce the Board's order in Everist.7" The court ac66. Id. at 202 (trial examiner's report).

67. Consistent with the conception of "business necessity" as a presumption, see
note 60 and accompanying text supra, the trial examiner found such "need" in the
prompt replacements and did not independently evaluate the actual "necessity" of hiring
replacements, although the proven urgency of completing the deliveries was deemed relevant to the determination that the employer was motivated by business rather than antiunion considerations. 142 N.L.R.B. at 203.
68. Id. at 202-05.
69. Id. at 195 n.5.
70. Id. at 195. Members Rogers and Leedom dissented, relying on the Auto Parts
and original Redwing Carriers decisions which held that a refusal to cross a picket
line under these circumstances is not protected concerted activity. Id. at 198.
71. NLRB v. L.G. Everist, Inc., 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1964). It is perhaps
significant to note that Judge Blackmun (now Mr. Justice Blackmun) sat on the Everist
panel.
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cepted arguendo both the Board's premise that a refusal to cross picket
lines is conduct generally encompassed by the literal words of section
7 and the qualifying premise of Redwing Carriersthat immediate replacement of employees who so act must be justified by reference to
"business necessity." The court nevertheless rejected the Board's conclusion that such employees are entitled to be treated as economic
strikers with the right of reinstatement prior to replacement. 2 Although purporting not to decide the section 7 issue in the abstract, the
court's reasons for rejecting the economic striker analogy strongly suggest a disagreement with the Board on this fundamental issue.
The court relied on the Supreme Court's rejection of the economic
striker analogy in Rockaway News. It would appear, moreover, that
the court was adopting a combination of the rationale of the Rockaway
News court of appeals and the third possible rationale of the Supreme
Court as outlined above. 3 First, the court noted that
[t]he refusal of the drivers here to cross the picket line was merely
sympathetic activity against a third employer with whom the drivers
had no connection and with whose union they were not involved.

It did not constitute strike activity against their own employer nor
the employer to whom they were making deliveries. It had no
effect on their own
union, their contract or their relationship with
4
their employer.7

This conclusion is reminiscent of the language of the court of appeals
in Rockaway News,"5 and also suggests that the activity may not fall
within the ambit of section 7 at all for want of mutuality of benefit between the picketers and the discharged employees.
Turning to the court's interpretation of the Supreme Court's
Rockaway News opinion, it first should be reiterated that the most probable interpretation of the Supreme Court's language is that refusal
to cross a picket line was unprotected there because it was in breach of
the employee's duty under the collective bargaining agreement." The
court of appeals in Everist apparently "tuned in" to this rationale and ex-

panded it somewhat. The court acknowledged that Rockaway News involved the breach of an express term, but said there is "no difference between the refusal to cross a picket line in violation of such a bargaining
72. Id. at 316.

73.
74.
75.
76.

See text accompanying note 48 supra.
334 F.2d at 317.
See text accompanying note 41 supra.
Thus, perhaps the court was implicitly reaffirming its express holding to this

effect in Illinois Bell Telephone. See notes 14-18 and accompanying text supra.

77. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
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contract and the refusal to cross a picket line in violation of the ordinary
and implied obligations of employment. '78 In short, such a refusal is
cause for discharge and is not, thus, protected concerted activity. This
approach leaves refusals to cross picket lines with scant protection indeed. At the most, the employee would be protected against employer
reprisal only when the refusal to cross was made on the employee's own
time. 7 Moreover, if a refusal to cross is to be deemed a breach of
an implied term of the contract of employment, the actual existence
of a "business necessity" is rendered irrelevant from the section
8(a) (1) perspective. While the court in Everist emphasized that a
"business necessity" did exist in that case, that was in the context of
indicating approval of the conclusions reached by the trial examiner
who had viewed the problem from strictly the section 8(a)(3) perspective.8 0
In Everist the Board did not pass on the legality of the initial discharge; the decision, rather, focused on the refusal to reinstate. In essence, the Board said that, assuming the initial discharge was justified
by "business necessity," such "necessity" could not additionally justify
a refusal to reinstate prior to the time permanent replacements were
hired. Since this theory-and, indeed, the section 8(a)(1) approach
altogether-found little favor with the court of appeals, in the next
case the Board adopted a slightly different tack. In Overnite Transportation Co.81 the Board focused on the initial discharge and evaluated
its legality under the "business necessity" test, but again mainly from
a section 8(a)(1) perspective.
In that case a truck driver was assigned to make a pick-up at a
company whose employees were on strike. The driver refused to cross
the picket line and another driver subsequently made the pick-up.
The refusing driver was discharged. In an opinion that virtually defies
analysis, the trial examiner held that the discharge was not illegal. The
Board reversed, holding that the discharge could not be justified under
a "business necessity" rationale.
The Board noted that the employer's drivers were not assigned
regular routes, that reassignment of the job was accomplished with little
difficulty, that the driver otherwise performed all of his assigned duties,
and that there was no showing that the driver's "conduct rendered him
78. 334 F.2d at 317 (emphasis added).
79. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
80. 334 F.2d at 315-16.
81. 154 N.L.R.B. 1271 (1965), enforced in part sub nom, Truck Drivers Local
728 v. NLRB, 364 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Overnite 1).
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incapable of performing his job or that is disrupted the respondent's business in any significant respect." 82 The Board distinguished Redwing
Carrierson the ground that the refusing driver there had been permanently and exclusively assigned to certain projects that were being
picketed. His refusal to cross the picket line interfered totally with his
job and necessitated the hiring of new employees to do the work. The
Board thus concluded that "the employer who would justify a discharge
on the basis of an overriding employer interest must present more than
a mere showing that someone else may have to do the work. '83
As far as legal theory is concerned, Overnite Transportationmarks
a departure from the Board's prior approach and from the Mackay
economic striker analogy. At the time of the Board hearing, apparently no permanent replacement had been hired for the discharged
employee."' That presumably would have been irrelevant in any event
since the Board found the initial discharge to be illegal for reasons
totally unrelated to that fact. Even if a permanent replacement had
been hired, the initial discharge still would have been illegal under the
Board's view because it could not be justified by "business necessity."
In contrast to its approach in Redwing Carriersand to the presumption
of "business necessity" under the Mackay test, the Board in Overnite
Transportation undertook its own evaluation of business realities and
concluded that -they did not indicate the "necessity" of discharging the
employee under the circumstances in question.
Overnite Transportationalso represents a shift in the Board's tactics with respect to the entrenchment of picket line observance as a protected concerted activity. In Everist the Board had attempted to limit
the employer's right of discharge by elaborating an exception that was
essentially a "question of law" 85-and thus a question over which the
court of appeals would normally exercise almost de novo review.80 In
Overnite Transportation, however, the Board relied on two broad,
meaningless propositions of law-that a refusal to cross is generally a
protected concerted activity and that "business necessity" may justify
discharge-then attempted to insulate its decision from effective judicial review by retreating into an ostensibly factual determinationwhich is reviewable by a court only under the abbreviated "substantial
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 1275.
Id.
Id. at 1273-74.
See text accompanying note 78 supra.
See generally K. DAvis, ADMINSaTRATv

LAw TEXT 525 (3d ed. 1972).
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evidence" standard.8 7 This pre-eminently factual approach, which
characterizes many of the remaining Board decisions, not only obfuscates the details of the inevitable evolving legal theories, but also makes
objective analysis more difficult.
The court of appeals in the Overnite case was not, however, to be
put off so easily. The court agreed that the discharge of the employee
who refused to cross the picket line was illegal, but the court founded
this exclusively on the section 8(a)(3) predicate-that the discharge
was discriminatory-and declined to consider whether the employee
was also engaged in protected concerted activity under section 7 and
8(a) (1). Thus once again the Board's section 8 (a) (1) offensive was
stalled by an unresponsive court of appeals.
In a subsequent Overnite case s8 the trial examiner, whose opinion
was adopted by the Board, relied on a quotation from the prior case
to establish that a refusal to cross a picket line was a protected concerted activity, subject only to the "business necessity" exception. The
trial examiner then construed the exception as requiring proof of two
separate facts: that the discharge was absolutely necessary in order to
get the freight delivered 9 and that the delivery itself was somehow
"necessary," in the sense of being urgent or imperative. 90 The trial
examiner, relying heavily on this employer's previous unfair labor practices as evidence of union animus, 91 also found the discharge to be discriminatory and in violation of section 8(a)(3).
The trial examiner's hard-line, two-pronged approach to the
"business necessity" exception did not survive the next case to be decided, some three months later. In Thurston Motor
Lines Inc.9 2 a
driver refused to cross a picket line to deliver freight to a customer on
the driver's regularly assigned route. The employer unsuccessfully attempted to enlist the use of substitute drivers, but the delivery was ultimately accomplished by a foreman. The refusing driver was discharged the following morning.
87. Id.
88. Overnite Transp. Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 72 (1967) (Overnite II).
89. The employer here was unable to meet that burden because of the availability
of other drivers willing to make the delivery in question. Id. at 74.
90. This requirement seem implicit in the language used by the trial examiner.

Id.
91. The Board's practice of substituting prior unfair labor practices for actual proof
of union animus in a subsequent case is not only irrational (since it assumes a permanent fall from grace) but is also an open manifestation of bias unbecoming an allegedly
"judicial" agency.

92. 166 N.L.R.B. 862 (1967).
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The trial examiner, after reviewing the relevant Board precedent
found the Redwing Carrierscase to be "most apposite"0 on the facts,
and upheld the discharge on the ground that the "business necessity"
test had been met. The employer obviously could not show that the
discharge was absolutely necessary in order for the delivery to be made,
as Overnite II would seem to require. Indeed, the employer was able
to make the delivery without discharge, a fact strenuously argued by
the general counsel. The trial examiner, while acknowledging the
Overnite I requirement of "more than a mere showing that someone
else may have to do the work," nevertheless concluded that
it is of no consequence here that Respondent was able to make the
delivery in question by a temporary, makeshift arrangement. In my
view, a common carrier need not undergo the risk of repeated
interruptions of his regular operation and need not be prepared to
institute
emergency procedures whenever such interruptions oc4
cur.9

The trial examiner's approach is significant for two reasons. First,
it would appear that he believed the Overnite I requirement should not
apply when the work which "someone else" must do is a regular part
of the refusing employee's job assignment. 95 Second, the trial examiner here construes "necessity" for discharge in terms of the overall,
continuing needs of a normal enterprise rather than in terms of accomplishing a specific delivery. Given a business situation like that of
Thurston, there is almost a presumption that the refusal of an employee
to cross a picket line will cause an interference with the efficient operations of that business and that discharge can be justified as a "business
necessity." This is certainly consonant with the generalized type of
"business necessity" that justifies hiring strike replacements under
Mackay, and with the business necessity test apparently adopted by the
96
Board in Redwing Carriers.
The second prong of the Overnite 11 test-that the employer show
that the delivery itself is a "business necessity"-was also argued by
the general counsel in this case, but the trial examiner rejected it out
of hand, indicating that "I do not consider it my function to assess the
93. Id. at 866.
94. Id.
95. The trial examiner did not expressly say so, but his emphasis upon the fact
that "Overnite's men were not assigned to regular routes," while in this case "the task
in question was one regularly assigned to" the employee in question, suggests that this
was the basis of his refusal to apply the Overnite I doctrine of worker replacement
Id.
96. See notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra.
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relative importance of the various aspects of Respondent's operation.

It is enough to find, as I do find, that Respondent's right to operate,
either in fact or in its reasonable estimation, was in jeopardy."9 7
The trial examiner's conclusion that the discharge of this driver

did not violate section 8(a)(1) 98 was affirmed by the Board, whose
opinion merely stated that "[iun order to make a scheduled delivery,
Respondent had the right to replace driver Jackson when he refused
to cross the picket line at the Greer plant,"9 9 citing Redwing Carriers.10 0
The clarity and cogency of the Thurston decision is unfortunately
undermined by the trial examiner's and Board's resolution of a second
issue in that case. When the driver regularly assigned to make the de-

livery, Charles Jackson, declined to do so, one of the individuals who
was asked to substitute for Jackson was another driver for the company,

James Cripps, who had a regularly assigned route of his own. Cripps
also refused to cross the picket line, and he was discharged at the same
time as Jackson. The trial examiner held that the discharge of Cripps

was a violation of section 8 (a) (1).
The trial examiner's basis for distinguishing between Jackson and

Cripps is not clear. He merely noted that vis-a-vis Cripps the employer
had no overriding interest in protecting his business, and that the de-

livery job Cripps was asked to perform was not within the ambit of his
regular duties. 101
Why the employer had an "overriding interest" in discharging

Jackson but not Cripps can possibly be explained as follows. When
Jackson refused to make the delivery, the employer was initially faced
97. .166 N.L.R.B. at 866. This too is consistent with "business necessity" as a
presumption rather than as something which must be proved. In any event, since in
this case the Interstate Commerce Commission had directed that the delivery be accOmplished, Thurston could have shown "business necessity" in this regard had it been required to do so. The special problems of ICC regulated common carriers, whose emloyees refuse to cross picket lines to make deliveries, have been dealt with in a number
of articles. See, e.g., Elbert & Rebman, Common Carriersand Picket Lines, 1955 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 232; Marshall, CarrierService and the Picket Line: A Dilemma, 13 LAB. LJ.
301 (1962); Scurlock, Carriersand the Duty to Cross Picket Lines, 39 TEXAS L. Rv.
298 (1961).
98. The general counsel had also argued before the trial examiner that the discharge violated section 8(a)(3), and apparently used for proof of motive a finding
of union animus by the Board in an earlier proceeding. The trial examiner, however,
noted that the employer had tried to resolve the problem short of discharge and that
the assignment of the delivery was a plausible one since it was on the employee's regular
route, facts which thus negate an anti-union motivation for the discharge. 166 N.L.R.B.
at 866. The Board did not disturb this finding.
99. Id. at 862.
100. Id. at 862 n.1.
101. Id. at 866.
.
'
.
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with two options: During the pendency of the strike, Thurston could
either forego deliveries to this customer or have them made by supervisory personnel. Since either alternative involves "repeated interruptions of his regular operation,"' 0 2 the law makes a third alternative
available to him-the replacement of the refusing employee with a new
employee who will cross the picket line. Since this alternative of avoiding injury to his business was already available to the Thurston man-

ager at the time he asked Cripps to make the delivery, it was not "necessary" that the employer discharge Cripps in order to protect his business; sthe law had already provided the appropriate remedial proteco
tion.
The Board affirmed the trial examiner's decision that the discharge of Cripps was illegal. The Board agreed that there was no

"need" to discharge Cripps, but predicated this lack of "need" on the
fact that at the time of Cripps' discharge the delivery had already been

made. 10 4 The same could have been said of the discharge of Jackson,
which leaves the Board's rationale obscure, to say the least. Moreover,
although the Board did not disturb the trial examiner's finding that the
discharge of Cripps was not motivated by union animus in violation of
section 8(a)(3), 105 the Board did note that the employer "knew that

Cripps was a strong union adherent and thus would be a poor replacement choice for crossing the picket line of a sister organization."' 10
The next major case' 0 7 to come before the Board, and the last

to warrant individualized analysis, is Swain & Morris ConstructionCo. 0 8
The case involved-to simplify the facts somewhat-two employees
102. Id.
103. Compare this with Overnite Transp. Co., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 85 L.R.R.M.
1120 (July 23, 1974) in which it was held that the discharge of the first refusing employee was illegal but that the discharge of other employees who were subsequently
asked to make the delivery was justified by considerations of business necessity.
104. 166 N.L.R.B. at 862.
105. The trial examiner had said that "I am unconvinced that the selection of
Cripps to take over the task [delivery to the struck employer] was based upon anything
other than that he was in the best position at the moment to do so," thus negating
a possible anti-union motivation. Id. at 866.
106. Id. at 862.
107. Vangas, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 960 (1967), was actually the next picket line case
to come before the Board. The picket line issue was, however, but one of several
unfair labor practices lodged against this employer. The trial examiner found that the
discharge of the refusing employee could not be justified in terms of "business necessity."
The issue was not discussed by the Board; it merely affirmed the trial examiner's conclusion in this regard. The case is thus of minimal importance at this point, but will
be referred to later in reference to the factors the trial examiner relied on with respect
to the "business necessity" issue.
108. 168 N.L.R.B. 1064 (1967), enforced, 431 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1970).
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who refused to cross a picket line at a business to which they were assigned to make an electrical installation. At the time of their refusal,
there were no available replacements in the job market, it was economically infeasible for the employer to assign the work to other employees,
and it was likely that the employer's other crews would also refuse to
cross the line. The two refusing employees were discharged. Several
weeks later, after the picketing had stopped, a replacement crew of existing employees was brought in to do the job.
Addressing himself to the legality of the discharges, the trial examiner focused exclusively on the "business necessity" consideration
The general counsel had argued that under the Redwing Carrierstest
the discharge of employees for refusing to cross a picket line could
never be justified on the basis of "business necessity" unless new employees were hired to complete the Work immediately. Since in this
case the discharged employees were never replaced with new hires and
the work was not done until some time later, the general counsel argued that legal justification for the discharges did not exist. After stating the general counsel's theory, the trial examiner then proceeded to
examine the extant precedent and, like the trial examiner in Thurston,
concluded that Redwing Carriers controlled. He noted that the
discharged employees were, for the duration of the job at least, permanently assigned to the work site they refused to enter; unlike. the
employees in Overnite, this was their "regular" work. He noted, moreover, that the employer's work assignments were not flexible and that
other employees were not readily available to do the work. Finally,
rejecting the general counsers contention that the "replace" requirement of Redwing Carriersapplied only to new hires, the trial examiner
noted that, in order to get the job done, it was necessary to bring in
a crew from another location.
It is somewhat difficult to extract legal principles from the trial
examiner's decision, focusing as it did upon the factual considerations.
It would appear, however, that he conceived of the "business necessity"
justification in much the same terms as had the trial examiner in the
preceding Thurston case. That is, the emphasis seemed to be upon
"justification" in the sense of being "fair" or "reasonable," given the
nature of the employer's, business, rather than in terms of the specific
necessity of getting a particular job accomplished immediately. - The
Board reversed the trial examiner, holding that the discharge did violate section 8(a)(1). The trial examiner's findings of fact were accepted, but the Board noted that."we ,arrive at a contrary conclusion, *be-
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cause of our different interpretation of the law applicable to those
facts."'10 9 The Board elaborated by merely stating that Redwing
Carriersestablished not one but two conditions that the employer must
meet to qualify under the "business necessity" justification. "The employer must act 'only to preserve efficient operation of his business, and
...only so it could immediately or within a short period thereafter
replace them with others willing to perform the scheduled work
2"110

The Board then held that this second condition had not been met,
for at the time of the discharge the employer knew that he "could not hire
new employees to perform the work because of an acute shortage of
unemployed linemen in the area."'' The Board thus concluded that
the discharges were not for the purpose of obtaining replacements to
preserve the efficient operation of the business. The Board also found
that the existence of a "business necessity" was negated by the fact that
there was no particular urgency involved in the job that the discharged
employees refused to perform."12 In short, an employee's refusal to
cross a picket line must not only interfere with the completion of a job
that requires immediate attention, but also the discharge of that employee must result in the hiring of replacements.
The Board's order was enforced by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion that adds nothing but confusion to an already
chaotic state of the law."$ Although the Board had spoken in terms
of "the motivating cause for" and the "purpose of" the discharges,"1 4
clearly the Board was using these terms in an objective sense and not
in a subjective sense to define an actual state of mind of the employer.
Motive is generally thought to be irrelevant in a purely section 8 (a) (1)
case,"15 which was the exclusive perspective from which the Board was
evaluating -this discharge. The court, however, reacted as if the case
turned on the employer's actual motive for discharging the employees.1

16

109. Id.
110. Id. at 1065, quoting Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1547 (1962)
(the emphasis and ellipticals are the Board's).
111. 168 N.L.R.B. at 1065.
112. Id.
113. NLRB v. Swain & Morris Constr. Co., 431 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1970).
114. 168 N.L.R.B. at 1065.
115. "A violation of § 8(a)(1) alone . . .presupposes an act which is unlawful
even absent a discriminatory motive." Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co.,
380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965).
116. This would certainly be relevant if the case were being evaluated from a section 8(a)(3) perspective, but the court did not seem to be aware of the difference.
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Without expressly holding that a refusal to cross a picket line was
generally a protected concerted activity under section 7 or even mentioning the "business necessity" exception as such, the court enforced
the Board's order on the grounds that there was substantial evidence
to support the Board's finding that the discharges were not motivated
by bona fide business considerations; rather, the "real reason for the
discharge was to make an example of the employees involved." 11 7 The
substantial evidence upon which the court relied was simply the two
facts enumerated by the Board-the unavailability of any replacements
and the non-urgency of the particular job in question.
Where, then, does this leave the state of the law?
1Il.

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW WITH RESPECT TO

AN

EMPLOYEE'S REFUSAL TO CROSS A PICKET LINE AT
ANOTHER EMPLOYER!S PREMISES

A. A GeneralStatement of the Law
In Swain & Morris ConstructionCo. the trial examiner stated the
present law about as succinctly as possible. He noted that "an individual employee's refusal in the course of his employment to cross the
picket line of a union other than his own at a place of employment of
another employer constitutes protected concerted action on his part.""'
He then added that, however, "the employer may require the employee
or employees to cross such a picket line under penalty of termination
where it is necessary for the efficient operation of his business (and
he is not otherwise motivated).""' 9 Having thus exhausted the available statements of legal abstraction, he then realistically noted that
"[tihe issue, however, is when does such necessity exist."' 12 0 This latter
consideration indeed is the critical issue. And as the Board later noted,
the resolution of that issue "necessarily depends on the facts in each
case."' 2 ' The Board's -preoccupation with "business necessity" as a
purely factual concept that had its genesis in Overnite I reached the
threshold of its maturity in Swain & Morris. In the remainder of the
As indicated earlier, see notes 59-63 and accompanying text supra, the Board in Redwing
Carriershad also spoken in terms of actual motive and purpose, but that decision is
thoroughly imbued with section 8(a) (3) considerations--to which motive is clearly relevant
117. 431 F.2d at 863.
118. 168 N.L.R.B. at 1069.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1065.
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cases,' 22 this approach reigns supreme. The' cases adopt, either
expressly or by implication, a highly generalized statement of "the law"
and then degenerate into a process of identifying the most factually
analogous precedent as the basis for decision. The trick, therefore, is
to identify those factual elements that the Board or the courts have
deemed relevant to the question of "business necessity." Some slightly
more abstract observations about the nature of the "business necessity"
test should, however, precede that rather mechanical endeavor.
First, it is absolutely clear that as a legal justification for the discharge of picket line observers, "business necessity" does not command
the kind of presumptive existence, rebutted only by a showing of union
animus, that is enjoyed by the "necessity" which justifies the permanent
replacement of economic strikers under the Mackay doctrine. Rather,
in the picket line context, "business necessity" is something that must
be proved, and it can be found not to exist for reasons other than the
presence of union animus.
Second, it would appear that with respect to the meaning of "business necessity," the Board, depending perhaps on who sits on each
panel, is vacillating somewhere between the "broad exigencies of the
business" approach of the Thurston trial examiner and the "bordering
on business collapse" mentality of Overnite Il-with the tendency, if
there is one, slightly toward the more liberal view of "necessity."
This is evidenced by the last two cases to be decided by the Board.
In Overnite TransportationCo. (Overnite 111)123 the administrative law
judge, by reference to most of the factors to be discussed next, found
that no "business necessity" existed for the discharge cum replacement
of an employee who refused to work behind a picket line at another
employer's premises. The Board, however, reached a contrary conclusion. The difference between the Board and its administrative law
judge was not one of abstract law, nor did it pertain to the propriety
of the various factors used for determining the presence of "business
necessity." Rather, there was simply a difference of opinion about the
scope and meaning of these factors, the emphasis that should be placed
122. In addition to Vangas, Inc., 168 -N.L.R.B. 960 (1967), the remainder of the
cases, in chronological order, are as follows: Alamo Express, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 315
(1968), enforced, 430 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971);
Smith Transit, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1969); Braswell Motor Freight Line, 189
N.L.R.B. 503 (1971); Frederickson Motor Express Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 82
L.R.R.M. 1091 (Oct. 10, 1972); Overnite Transp. Co., 209 N.L.R.B. No. 112, 85
L.R.R.M. 1458 (March 13, 1974); Overnite Transp. Co., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 87
L.R.R.M. 1120 (July 23, 1974).
123. 209 N.L.R.B. No. 112, 85 L.R.R.M. 1458 (March 13, 1974).
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on each factor, and whether certain relevant facts could be inferred from the record. Although the Board clearly did not revert fully
to the "business exigencies" approach of the trial examiner in Thurston,
the Board did quote him to the effect that "the employer is not required
to institute a 'temporary, makeshift arrangement' or emergency procedures in order to preserve the efficient operation of his business. '124
Although this is slim tangible evidence of a shift in Board policy,
to a "sensitized" reader of Board deicisons Overnite III has a certain
aura about it that suggests a greater receptivity to employer claims of
"business necessity."
Subsequently, however, in Overnite IV125 the administrative law
judge held that the replacement of a whole group of drivers was justified by considerations of "business necessity" and, as did the Board in
the preceding Overnite III case, he quoted the somewhat expansive
language of Thurston.1 6 As in Overnite III, the Board again held that
the administrative law judge's statement of the law was correct, but that
his application of the law to the facts was in part erroneous.1 27 Thus,
in a confusing bit of hair splitting, the Board held that the discharge
and replacement of the first driver who refused to cross the picket line
was illegal because, apparently, other drivers were available to make
the delivery, 28 but at the same time the Board acquiesced in the
judge's finding that the discharge and replacement several days later
of four other drivers who refused to cross the same picket line was justified by considerations of "business necessity" because no substitute
drivers were available. This reversal of the administrative law judge
on a narrow factual point thus suggests a continued "persnicketiness"
on the Board's part to the "business necessity" requirements.
In any event, both the broad and the narrow views of "business
necessity" focus on the same factual elements, and it is to those elements that we now turn.
B. FactorsRelevant to the Issue of "Business Necessity"
(1) The Actual Hiring of Permanent Replacements (or
Seeking to Hire Them)
This is arguably the most important of the various factors. Under
at least one interpretation of the Redwing Carriers formulation,
124. Id. at 4, 85 L.R.R.M. at 1459.
125. Overnite Transp. Co., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 87 L.R.R.M. 1120 (July 23,
1974) (Overnite IV).
126. Id. at 16 (administrative law judge's decision).
127. Id. at 2, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1121.
128. ld. at 2-3, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1121.
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discharge is permitted in order to hire permanent replacements which
in turn must be justified by considerations of business necessity. Logically, one need not reach the "business necessity" question if the employer has made no effort to replace the discharged employee. It is
only when a permanent replacement is hired (or sought) that the "necessity" of this discharge/replacement becomes relevant.
All five of the discharges which have been upheld by the Board
were followed by the hiring of permanent replacements. 12 9 Of the
three discharges utlimately sustained by the courts, 30 two involved the
hiring of permanent replacements.' 3 1 The court's opinion in Redwing
Carriersadds no explanatory rationale not already stated by the Board.
And the ultimate hiring of permanent replacements is probably irrelevant under the rationale of the court in Everist; the court certainly
did not emphasize it as being a critical factor.
In four cases the Board found a discharge to be illegal despite the
fact that permanent replacements had been hired.13 2 Everist, of
course, technically did not involve the legality of the initial discharge;
the Board there merely held that the employer's refusal to reinstate an
employee before he had been permanently discharged was an unfair
labor practice. Overnite II, Thurston (discharge of Cripps), and
Overnite IV merely demonstrate that not every permanent replacement
129. Overnite Transp. Co., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 87 L.R.RM 1120 (July 23, 1974)
(Overnite IV); Overnite Transp. Co., 209 N.L.R.B. No. 112, 85 L.R.R.M. 1458 (March
13, 1974) (Overnite 111); Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 862 (1967) (Jackson discharge); Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961), modified, 137
N.L.R.B. 1545, affd sub nom. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C.
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964); Auto Parts Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 242
(1953).
130. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953); NLRB V. L.G.
Everist, Inc., 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1964); Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d
1011 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964), aff'g Redwing Carriers,
Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962).
131. The third, Rockaway News, is essentially a case of contract rather than stattitory interpretation.
132. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 862 (1967) (Cripps discharge);
Ovemite Transp. Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 72 (1967) (Overnite 11); L.G. Everist, Inc., 142
N.L.R.B. 193 (1963), enforcement denied in part, 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1964); cf.
Braswell Motor Freight Line, 189 N.L.R.B. 503 (1971) (partially qualifies in this regard). There a part-time employee took over (presumably on a full-time basis) the
discharged employee's normal duties; this employee had, however, left the job at the
time of the hearing. This prompted the trial examiner to note that "[jiudging from
the high rate of employee turnover Respondent has had in the times here pertinent,
it appears that the overall efficiency of Respondent's operations was more adversely
affected by Jolly's discharge as a relatively long term (1-year) employee than by his
refusal to pick the trailer in question." Id. at 506 (footnote omitted).
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will be justified as a "business necessity." In other words, permanent
replacement is a "necessary" but not an indpendently "sufficient" factor
with respect to the legality of the initial discharge.
Finally, among the cases in which the discharge was not upheld
the employer's failure to hire permanent replacements has several
times been mentioned as a relevant factor."' 3 The Board's opinion in
the Swain & Morris case is particularly important in this regard. In
that case the Board held that the employer had not discharged the employees "only so it could immediately or within a short period thereafter replace them with others willing to perform the scheduled work,"1 34
one of the two Redwing Carriersrequirements, for at the time of the
discharge the employer knew that he "could not hire new employees
to perform the work because of an acute shortage of unemployed linemen in the area."' 33 The Board concluded that the discharges were
not, therefore, for the purpose of obtaining replacements to preserve
the efficient operation of the business. The same conclusion follows
a fortiori when replacements are available in the labor market but the
employer fails to attempt to hire them.
The importance of this factor, though statistically demonstrable
and implicit in the various Board and court decisions, was not openly
expressed until fairly recently.' 30 In Overnite III the Board put considerable emphasis on the fact that the discharged employee had been
immediately replaced, 137 and in Overnite IV the administrative law
judge, in stating the law that the Board said was correct, noted that "it
is .. . essential that the employer prove that replacements were hired
to perform the work . ..."I
133. Smith Transit, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1083-84 (1969); Ovemite Transp. Co.,
154 N.L.R.B. 1271, 1274 (1965), enforced sub nom. Truck Drivers Local 728 v. NLRB,
364 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Overnite I).
134. Swain & Morris Constr. Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 1064, 1065 (1967).
135. Id.

136. In Auto Parts the Board apparently considered the hiring of permanent replacements and indeed the "business necessity" factor itself as being primarily relevant from
a section 8(a)(3) perspective. In Redwing Carriersthe Board merely mentioned the
fact that permanent replacements had been hired. With respect to the discharge of
Jackson in the Thurston decision, the trial examiner noted the fact of permanent replacement, but apparently considered it relevant only in conjunction with the fact that at
the time of such replacement Jackson had not made an unconditional request for reinstatement-thus demonstrating that an Everist situation was not present. And the Board
in that case merely affirmed that the employer did indeed have a "right to replace"
the refusing driver.
137. 209 N.L.R.B. No. 112 at 3, 85 L.R.R.M. at 1459.
138. 212 N.L.R.B. No 84 at 15 (administrative law judge's decision) (emphasis
added).
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(2)

The Use or Availability of Other Employees (Including
Supervisory Personnel) to Perform the Refused
Work on a Temporary Basis
While the expeditious hiring of permanent replacements, though
not controlling, generally lends credence to the motivation for the initial
discharge, the use or availability of other existing personnel to perform
the refused work on a temporary basis has a more ambivalent status
in the law. Whether this factor supports the legality or the illegality
of a discharge at one time depended to some extent on whether it was
joined by the presence of the first factor discussed above. That is,
while some of the cases' 1 9 have suggested that the availability of other
employees to perform the work generally indicates a lack of "business
necessity" for discharging a refusing employee, others suggest that this
inference may be negated when the temporary use of existing employees is supplanted by the prompt hiring of permanent replacements. 40
This neat statement of the law is, however, destroyed by the recent Overnite IV decision. There, with respect to the first driver who
refused to cross the picket line, a substitute employee was utilized, and
even though a permanent replacement was rather promptly hired, the
Board held that the initial discharge of this driver was not justified by
considerations of "business necessity." The Board also noted that at
-the time the driver first protested his assignment, "there is reason to
believe that there would have been little difficulty in finding a driver
to take Freeman's place'1 4 '-this evidenced by the fact that a substitute
driver did take the delivery through the picket line later in the day.
In short, subject still to some considerations of business convenience and efficiency, according to the latest Board decision the use or
availability of substitute employees to perform the refused work
negates any "business necessity" for discharge, even if a permanent replacement is eventually hired.
The Overnite 111 case also presents an interesting variation on the
"use of other employees" theme. There the discharged employee was
permanently replaced, but the replacement was a current employee in
another job classification. The administrative law judge treated this
139. See cases cited note 122 supra.
140. Thurston Motor Lines, 166 N.L.R.B. 862 (1967) (Jackson discharge); Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961), modified, 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, af'd sub
nom. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 905 (1964); Auto Parts Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 242 (1953) (to the extent that
the case can be said to contain any section 8(a)(1) law).
141. 212 N.L.R.B. No. 84 at 3, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1121.
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like the temporary substitution in Overnite 1,142 but the Board implicitly
treated the permanent replacement by an existing employee as the equivalent of a new hire. It noted that "although there were 35-40 city
drivers employed by Respondent at the time it terminated Tingen,
there is no evidence in the record before us that any of these other
employees were available to perform the work that Tingen had refused
This quotation is also significant in that it places upon the
general counsel the burden of proving the absence of "business necessity"-at least with respect to this element. Previously, it was
thought to be the employer's duty to prove the elements of "business
necessity"; 144 but under Overnite III, if the record is silent with respect
to the availability of temporary replacements, the presumption will be
that there were none.
The use of supervisory personnel to perform the refused work was
apparently relied upon in one case to support a conclusion that the discharge could not be justified by considerations of "business necessity."
In Smith Transit, Inc.145 the trial examiner noted that the refusing employee's work was performed by a supervisor and that the company,
therefore, "was not dependent upon replacing him with other rank-andfile truckdrivers who might be as unwilling to unload the trailer" as was
the discharged employee. 140 On the other hand, in the.Thurston decision the trial examiner expressly discounted the fact that the company
"was able to make the delivery in question by a temporary, makeshift
arrangement" using supervisory personnel.' 47 It should also be noted
that Thurston entailed the prompt hiring of a permanent replacement,
while this was not true of Smith Transit. Hopefully, the Smith case
may turn on that fact, for it is clearly erroneous to equate supervisory
personnel with other readily available rank-and-file employees. The
use of supervisory personnel to perform the refused work represents
an extraordinary misallocation of corporate resources, and resort to such
an expedient clearly suggests the urgency of the work in question-a
factor of "business necessity" to be discussed below. Thus in cases in
which a permanent replacement is ultimately hired, the fact that supervisors were used in the interim to perform the refused work should not
operate to negate the presence of the "business necessity" for the initial
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

209 N.L.R.B. No. 112 at 6 (administrative law judge's decision).
Id.
Braswell Motor Freight Line, 189 N.L.R.B. 503 (1971).
176 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1969).
Id. at 1084.
Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 862, 866 (1967).
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discharge; to the contrary, it logically supports a finding of such "necessity."
The direction in which this "temporary replacements" factor cuts
also seems to depend upon the presence or absence of a third factorto wit:
(3)

The Non-Routine and Irregular Nature of the Work,
from the Perspective of the Refusing Employee's
Normal Employment Assignments

When the refused work is not a regular part of a specific
employee's work assignment, the availability of several employees to
perform the works suggests that there is no "business necessity" for discharging the first refusing employee since a reassignment of the work
can be made without serious disruption to the employer's business.1 48
Conversely, when the refused work is a regular part of a specific employee's work assignment-as in Redwing Carriers and Thurstonthe resulting inconvenience of making temporary reassignments may be
so great as to constitute a "business necessity" for discharge and permanent replacement.
The Overnite I1 case again sheds significant new light on the
meaning of this element. The administrative law judge routinely
noted that the discharged employee "did not drive a regular or established route, being shifted from day to day as one of 35-40 'city drivers'
. . ,,9 which was literally true.

The Board, however, viewed the

element more pragmatically-that is, from the perspective of whether
the substitution of another driver would seriously disrupt the employer's
business-and concluded that the work refused by the discharged employee was in fact a part of his "regular duties." This conclusion was
based on both the frequency of the assignment of deliveries to the
struck premises and the amount of time required to make these deliveries. 150 The Board noted that "clearly, the assignment Tingen refused
148. See Fredrickson Motor Express Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 82 L.R.R.M. 1091
(Oct. 10, 1972); Braswell Motor Freight Line, 189 N.L.R.B. 503, 506 (1971); Smith
Transit; Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1084 (1969); Alamo Express, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 315,
326 (1968), enforced, 430 F.2d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1021- (1971); Swain & Morris Constr. Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 1064, 1065 n.4 (1967), enforced, 431 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1970); Vangas, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 960, 962 (1967).
149. 209 N.L.R.B. No. 112 at 6 (administrative law judge's decision).
150. Id. at 4. The discharged employee was normally assigned to make deliveries
to the struck premises two Or three times a week, apd ealh delivery recquirel fou.r or
five hop,
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herein was not 'a one-shot operation' "

5 1-which

thus suggests that

only a "one-shot operation" will qualify as a temporary or non-routine
work assignment for the purpose of negating "business necessity" for
discharge.
The Overnite IV case reflects a continued adherence to this broad
construction of the "regular duties" factor. There the administrative
law judge held that
although . . . the Respondent's drivers were not assigned to fixed
and regular runs, pickups and deliveries at the Ferenback plants
[where the picket lines were established] constituted a substantial
portion of the regular work of all drivers at the Bristol Terminal,
including -the five drivers who [sic] status is here in contest.r-2
This finding was not disturbed by the Board.
While this "ready availability" of other employees (i.e. a combination of the second and third factors) is frequently relied upon to negate a finding of "business necessity" for discharge, the exact converse-a situation involving the immediate unavailability of other
employees to perform work regularly assigned to the refusing employee-has also been said to negate the presence of "business
necessity." Such is the quixotic holding of Swain & Morris. Arguably,
the Board's decision in that case can be limited to situations in which
neither present nor prospective employees are available. There is some
logic for predicating a finding of no "business necessity" on those facts,
but the court of appeals in Swain & Morris merely emphasized the immediate unavailability of other existing crews to perform the work' 58
and concluded from this "that the only real reason for the discharge
was to make an example of the employees involved."' 154 Perhaps this
suggests that despite the possibility of eventual permanent replacement
of a refusing employee, a discharge will be illegal unless the refused
work is immediately performed by a substitute employee (or by the
permanent replacement, if hired immediately). In other words, not
only the discharge itself but also the timing must be justified by "business necessity." This, of course, is pure speculation; but hopefully
there is some underlying logic to the coures exclusive emphasis on this
point.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
212 N.L.R.B. No. 84 at 16 (administrative law judge's decision).
NLRB v. Swain & Morris Constr. Co., 431 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir. 1970).
Id.
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(4)

The Percentage of the Employer's Work the Employee
Refuses to Perform; the Availability
of Alternative Work
The two extremes of this factor can be characterized as follows:
On the one hand, a driver refuses to make a single delivery to one of
many nonrecurring customers, as in the case of an independent package
delivery company; on the other hand, a driver refuses to make deliveries to the employer's currently exclusive customer, as in the case of
a ready-mix concrete company whose total output is for a time being
delivered to a single construction site. In the first situation, the employee who refuses to cross a single picket line has ample substitute
work while in the second situation the employee's refusal to cross the
picket line results in a total cessation of his work. Clearly, the degree
of interference with the employer's business is different in the two situations. The Board has made oblique references to this factor on several occasioni,155 and the court in Swain & Morris noted that "other
assignments were available which would not have required the workers
to cross picket lines and which would not put the employer in the position of keeping men on the payroll for whom there was no work." 1 0
In Overnite III both the administrative law judge and the Board expressly recognized the relevance of this factor. The administrative law
judge concluded that "there were other jobs, including driving jobs and
runs, to which Tingen could readily have been . . .assigned."' 7 The

Board, however, found that the employer's "assertion that it had no
other city driving work available to assign to Tingen when it replaced
him is uncontradicted."' 58
(5) The "Non-urgency" or "Unimportance" of the Refused Work
In the Thurston case the trial examiner expressly refused to assess
personally the "relative importance" of the work that the discharged
employee refused to perform.' 59 Unfortunately, this kind of restraint
has not always prevailed on the Board or in the courts. For example,
in Swain & Morris the court of appeals concluded that it was reasonable
155. Braswell Motor Freight Line, 189 N.L.R.B. 503, 506 (1971); Smith Transit,
Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1084 (1969); Overnite Transp., 154 N.L.RB. 1271, 1274-75
(1965), enforced; 364 F.2d 682 -(D.C. Cir. 1966) (Overnite I); Redwing Carriers, Inc.,
137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1546, af'd sub nob. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011
(D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
156. 431 F.2d at 863.
157. 209 N.L.R.B. No. 112 at 6 (administrative law judge's decision).
158. 209 N.L.R.B. No. 112 at 5, 85 L.R.R.M. at 1459.
119. Thurston Motor Linos, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 862, 866 (1967).
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for the Board to find that the work "was not of such importance that
its immediate completion was necessary for the continuing and orderly
operation of respondent's business."'160
It is, of course, difficult to predict what work the Board will, or
will not, consider to be "urgent."'161 The type of facts which are most
often looked to include the quality of the business relationship between
the two employers (i.e. are transactions episodic, or continuing and
regular?),'1 2 the sheer quantity of the work which is being refused because of the picket line, 16 3 and the necessity (or lack thereof) of having
the work done on an immediate basis.' 64
(6)

The Existence and Enforcement of a "Flat Rule" Requiring
Employees to Cross Picket Lines in the Course
of Their Employment Duties
While the preceding factors ostensibly involve objective indicia of
"business necessity," the "flat rule" factor and union animus raise ques160. 431 F.2d at 863.
161. In Overnite I the Board simply found that the company "did not regard the
pickup as a matter of particular urgency." 154 N.L.R.B. at 1275 n.7. The employer's
failure ever to tell the employee that the delivery was "urgent" was noted by the trial
examiner in Braswell. 189 N.L.R.B. at 505. The facts relied on by the Board in
Swain & Morris were essentially these: (1) the job the employees refused to complete
because of the establishment of a picket line had originally been scheduled last; (2)
before the picket line was set up the employees did some work at this location, but
they returned to higher priority work as soon as supplies were available; (3) the customer had told the employer that the work in question was "not imperative"; and
(4) the employer did not in fact finish the work until 14 days after the discharges.
168 N.L.R.B. at 1065. Why this last fact is suggestive of "non-urgency" is not altogether clear. Despite the fact that it was 14 days before the work was finally done,
it would appear that this was the earliest date after the picketing ended that a substitute
crew could be put on this job. Nevertheless, the court of appeals also emphasized the
first and fourth of the above facts. 431 F.2d at 863.
Finally, the court of appeals in Everist summarized the "urgency" or "importance"
of the refused work in that case in the following terms:
It should probably be emphasized here that the uncontradicted testimony is
that the contract between respondent and the prime contractor provided that
continued and uninterrupted deliveries were essential; that the aggregate piles
were low; that interrupted deliveries could cause respondent to lose its contract;
and that at least some of the drivers were informed when they were hired
that deliveries could not be interrupted by strikes.
NLRB v. L.G. Everist, Inc., 334 F.2d 312, 315 (8th Cir. 1964).
162. In Smith Transit the trial examiner noted the lack of any "continuing regular
business" with the struck company, the interruption of which might have had serious
consequences to the employer. 176 N.L.R.B. at 1084.
163. The administrative law judge in Overnite IV noted that the struck business
was a "substantial customer" of the respondent employer and that pickups and deliveries
to this business constituted a "substantial portion" of his employees' work. 212 N.L.R.B.
No. 84 at 16 (administrative law judge's decision).
164. In Overnite II the trial examiner noted that the employer had tolerated several
days of delay before finally telling the employee that the delivery was "urgent" and
firing him for refusing to make it. 164 N.L.1KB. at 74.
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tions about the employer's mental processes and state of mind. In two
cases in which the discharge of an employee was found not to be justified by considerations of "business necessity," the Board went further
and noted that the employer's motivation was also impermissible. In
Overnite I, the Board indicated that the employer "equated the employee's refusal to cross the picket line with an act of insubordination, showing little or no regard for the countervailing employee rights that were examined and balanced in Redwing."'' 1 5 Later, in Alamo Express the
Board, waxing eloquent, noted that the employer had
adopted and declared, for the benefit of all and sundry, a policy
which there was no room for the legal test adopted by the Board,
and which required the discharge of all employees who refused to
cross a picket line, in advance of all specific confrontation of opposing rights, and automatically excludes from the consideration
of the employer those facts and circumstances by which the Board
distinguishes cases of the Overnight type from those more resembling Redwing.166
On the other hand, in Overnite III the employer testified that he
had a specific policy of requiring employees to cross picket lines except
in situations of threatened or actual violence. The administrative law
judge found that this policy incorporated "an improper standard under
the law,"' 8 1 and used this to further justify his conclusion that the specific discharge in question was illegal. The Board did not even mention the existence of this arguably overbroad policy; this perhaps suggests that the factor is actually irrelevant in cases in which there is objective evidence of "business necessity."
Overnite IV suggests, conversely, that where a lack of "business
necessity" is found, an employer's policy of discharging drivers who refuse to cross picket lines will be trotted out by the Board as further
evidence that the discharges in question were not motivated by
"business necessity."' 6 8 This analysis suggests that the "policy" factor
is simply a make-weight which the Board either ignores or uses to reinforce a decision reached on other grounds. Nevertheless, the wary employer should probably eschew announcing "simplistic" rules for his
employees such as one requiring that they cross all picket lines encountered in the course of the work for which they are being duly paid.
165. 154 N.L.R.B. at 1275.

166. Alamo Express, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 315, 326 (1968), enforced, 430 F.2d 1032

(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971).

167. 209 N.L.R.B. No. 112, at 8 (administrative law judge's decision).
168. 212 N.L.R.B. No. 84 at 3-4, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1121-22.
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(7)

Union Animus

Although the refusal-to-cross cases have now settled comfortably

into a section 8(a)(1) format, the presence of union animus and
other unfair labor practices by the employer are still frequently cited
as being relevant in these cases. 169 The evidence and analysis in this

context, however, is much more superficial than would be required
were the discharges actually being litigated on a section 8(a)(3) basis.
Moreover, even though the administrative law judge in Overnite III
made repeated references to what he considered to be the union animus of the employer,' 7 0 the Board ignored this factor totally.
(8)

"Discharge" versus "Replacement," and the Language
Used by the Employer in Effectuating the Result

Apparently related in some respects to the "union animus" factor
is the question of whether the recalcitrant employee was in legal contemplation "discharged" or merely "replaced." In this regard the language used by the employer is becoming increasingly relevant.
In Rockaway News, the Supreme Court rejected, vis-k-vis section
7 rights to honor a picket line, the distinction between "discharge" and
"replacement."'' 1 At least one interpretation of the Court's somewhat
cryptic language is that the specific language the employer uses is irrelevant to the legality of his conduct.
This, certainly, was the interpretation the Board immediately gave to the Court's language. In Redwing Carriers,the Board noted in regard to the continued validity of
the discharge-replacement distinction that "substance, rather than form,
should be controlling,"' 7 3 and that the decision should not turn "solely
on the basis of the precise words, i.e., replacement or discharge, used
by the employer . . . ",74 Thus, in subsequent cases, the fact that
an employee was literally "discharged," and the language used to accomplish it, were deemed pretty much irrelevant.
169. Alamo Express, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 315, 326 (1968), enforced, 430 F.2d 1032
(5th Cir. 1969); Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 862 (1967); Overnite
Transp. Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 72, 74 (1967) (Overnite 11); Overnite Transp. Co., 154
N.L.R.B. 1271, 1275 (1965), enforced in part sub nom. Truck Drivers Local 728 v.
NLRB, 364 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Overnite 1).
170. Overnite Transp. Co., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 112 at3, 6-1 (July-23, -1974) (administrative law judge's decision) (Overnite III).
171. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 75 (1953).
172. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
173. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1547, affd sub nom. Teamsters
Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
174. Id.
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A resurgence of the dichotomy was, however, hinted in Overnite
III. There the administrative law judge suggested that while the specific language used was irrelevant, a legal distinction of some kind exists between "discharge" (illegal) and "replacement" (legal) of picket
line observers. He found that the employee in that case had been "discharged" (even though he was also ultimately "replaced"). This finding was predicated on the fact that he "lost his job because of his
refusal to cross the picket line. ' 175 This is obviously so, and that was
the reason he was "replaced" as well, thus leaving the significance of
the "discharge" finding totally obscure. The Board reversed the administrative law judge, and as it had done in the preceding cases addressed itself to the legality of the discharge and replacement as a
single continuum.
In Overnite IV, however, the general counsel continued to argue
that the employees had been "discharged," treating that designation as
if it were determinative of legality.' 6 The administrative law judge
held as follows:
There is, in the first instance no evidence that the employees were
discharged. Each employee was told at the time of his separation
that he would have to be replaced, and there is no realistic evidence
that the Respondent was engaging in a subterfuge to hide an antiunion motive, or to77 discourage other employees from engaging in
concerted activity.'
Thus, the administrative law judge tacitly accepted the general
counsel's legal premise. And while under this view the discharge-separation or discharge-replacement dichotomy apparently turns on union
animus, what the employer says to the employee in effectuating the discharge-separation-replacement result is a relevant consideration with
respect to its legality.
Except with regard to the first driver who refused to cross the
iicket line, the Board agreed with its administrative law judge. But
with respect to this first driver, the Board held that his discharge was
illegal. The Board noted that "in distinguishing between 'replacement'
17 8
and 'discharge,' substance rather than precise wording is important."
The "substance" that the Board then relied upon suggests that an Me175. 209 N.L.R.B. No. 112 at 8 (administrative law judge's decision).
176. The general counsel used the term "terminate," but the administrative law
judge construed this as meaning "discharge." 212 N.L.R.B. No. 84 at 3 n.3 (administrative law judge's decision).
177. Id. at 16.
178. 212 N.L.R.B. No. 84 at 4, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1122.
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gal discharge takes place if: (1) the refusal to cross a picket line angers management (which is not exactly the same thing as union animus); (2) the difference between replacement and discharge is not
explained to the refusing employee (even though the Supreme Court
has said that the difference in this context is an "unrealistic" one); and/
or (3) the expressly stated reason for this discharge is anything other
than considerations of "business necessity" (this arguably relates to the
Board's prohibition of a "flat rule" against picket line observance). 179
Thus, it would appear that an employer must still watch his conduct and language very carefully whenever a decision is made to "withdraw from an active employment relationship" (to use an as yet neutral
term for what the employer seeks to do) with an employee who refuses
to cross a picket line in the course of his employment duties.
These then are the factors most commonly used by the Board and
the courts in assessing the "business necessity" of the discharge of an
employee who refuses in the course of his employment to cross a picket
line at another employer's premises. They are, at best, only crude indicators of the legality or illegality of any particular discharge. Much
depends upon the combinations in which they occur and, as Overnite
IlI and Overnite IV starkly demonstrate, they are highly susceptible of
divergent applications-depending upon the meaning and emphasis
that is given to each, what is deemed sufficient evidence, and who has
the burden of supplying it.
IV.

THE EXTENT TO WHICH REFUSAL TO CROSS A PICKET LINE
SHOULD BE A PROTECTED CONCERTED ACTIVITY

A. A Criticism of the "Business Necessity" Test as Currently Applied
Assuming theoretically that a refusal to cross a picket line at another employer's premises generally qualifies as a "concerted activity
for mutual aid or protection," there remains the problem-of determining the extent to which the activity is guaranteed against employer interference. Under current law, as described above, the "business necessity" test serves that definitional function; a refusal to cross is
protected against discharge except in cases of discharge justified by
considerations of "business necessity." This approach, however, is
subject to criticism on several grounds.
179. Id. at 4-5, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1122.

With respect to the third element listed

in the text, the Board merely noted that "Freeman alone among the drivers subsequently
received a slip from Respondent for purposes of the state employment security office
stating that he had been 'discharged' because of his refusal to 'carry out instructions.'"
Id. at 5, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1122.
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(1) Practical Considerations
In the first place, an application of the "business necessity" test
entails one of the most difficult of all judgmental exercises-the balancing of competing "interests" on a pre-eminently factual basis.
While easy predictability in the law is generally desirable, in the
picket line context it is imperative. When a driver confronts a picket
line in the course of his work, decisions frequently have to be made
quickly. It is not unusual for a driver, when confronted with a picket
line, to find the nearest phone and contact his union or his employer,
or both, for advice and instructions.15 0 In such a situation the individuals immediately concerned lack the time and often the information to
make the kind of contemplative, reasoned decision that one might expect of an NLRB administrative law judge-assuming that the driver,
his union, or the employer even know what factors are relevant in assessing the "legalities" of the situation. Even if the parties are aware
of the relevant considerations and have some time to assess their application, the inherent ambiguity of the approach leaves them with no
solid assurance that the Board or the courts will view the matter in the
same light. Yet, despite all this uncertainty, decisions having important personal and economic ramifications must be made-and must
often be made on the spot.
The picketing employees must also be considered. They certainly
are in no position to know the underlying "business facts" about the
job assigned to each truck that approaches the picket line. Thus, certain obnoxious conduct bordering on illegality' 5 ' may often be based
on the picketers' false assumption that the driver himself is personally
susceptible of conversion to the principles of "union morality," when
in fact the driver is crossing the line only because he is legally being
required to do so (i.e. because of the prospect of a legal discharge if he
180. See, e.g., Fredrickson Motor Express Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 82 L.RR.M.
1091 (Oct. 10, 1972); Braswell Motor Freight Line, 189 N.L.R.B. 503 (1971); Smith
Transit, Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1969); Alamo Express, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 315
(1968), enforced, 430 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971).
181. See, e.g., Fredrickson Motor Express Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 82 L.R.R.M.
1091 (Oct. 10, 1973) (as the driver approached the picket line he was surrounded by
10 to 15 strikers who shouted "lock her down right there, Buddy, you are not going
any further. . . we are on strike, and I don't think you are going to run over anybody
to go in there ... if you do, you are going to be sorry."); Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130
N.L.R.B. 1208, 1213 (1961), modified, 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, aff'd sub nom. Teamsters
Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964)
(employee was called "scab," "picket line breaker," and "scavanger"; was told that "it
would be more healthy if" he turned "around and did not make the pickup"; was kicked
at; and was advised not to cross the line because "if you do we ain't going to promise
you what will happen").
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refuses)-a circumstance which if known to the picketers might, hopefully, cause them to moderate their response to the "blameless" employee. Under the present "business necessity" approach this fact is
virtually unknowable.
Finally, it should be borne in mind that the various parties to a
picket line confrontation are going to view -these amorphous factors
from radically different perspectives; what is "necessary," "urgent," or
"important" to the employer will usually appear to be less so to the
union-even though both may approach the question in good faith.
In short, the parties' immediate conceptions of their "legal rights"
are apt to be highly subjective, emotional, deeply held, and mutually
inconsistent. Such a situation is conducive to precipitous and sometimes violent action, the effects of which are likely to discolor the employment relationship long after the immediate dispute is settled.
Since the regulation of human conduct is an essential function of the
law, when a decision of conduct must be made under circumstances not
allowing for leisurely consultation with learned counsel the law has an
affirmative obligation to be definite, relatively simple, and consequently
understandable by the private persons confronted with the decision.
Such a law will at least enable them to predict with reasonable accuracy
the legal consequences of their conduct. The "business necessity" approach, involving a balancing of case-specific factual considerations,
fails in this regard; it is thus ill-equipped to perform its ostensible function of regularizing personal decision making in the picket line context.
The "business necessity" test, as currently applied, also seems to
reflect a certain lack of administrative and judicial appreciation of the
exigencies of efficient business operation. The employer's orderly
operation of his business is obviously interrupted when he is required
to resort to the previously described alternatives, the availability of
which will operate to negate the presence of "business necessity" justifying discharge.1 1 2 This interference, however, has been dubbed a
mere "inconvenience"1 3 and insufficient to outweigh the employees'
182. A "business necessity" might not exist, for example, if other employees are
available to do the work, if supervisors can perform the job on an interim basis, if work
assignments can be shifted around to accommodate the refusing employee, if the refused
work is only a minor part of the employee's normal duties, and/or if the refused work
does not qualify as being "critically urgent." See text accompanying notes 139-47 supra.
183. Braswell Motor Freight Line, 189 N.L.R.B. 503, 506 (1971); Alamo Express,
Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 315, 326 (1968), enforced, 430 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971) (in both cases the alternative of using someone else to do
the work was recognized as an "inconvenience"-or, as in the latter case, a "slight inconvenience").
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section 7 rights." 4 The weight, however, that the Board and the courts
attach to this "inconvenience" is probably, as among the parties, a function of perspective; and the perspective from which the Board and the
1 85
court view it is remote indeed.
Under a system in which the efficient utilization of capital
resources is the immediate responsibility of management, it would seem
that, barring union animus, management's evaluation of the "inconvenience" should be heeded more than it is under the present approach.
The actual "cost"-in terms of lost time, inefficiency, and misallocation
of resources-of the alternatives which currently operate to negate the
presence of "business necessity" should at least be reassessed by the
Board and the courts. When management makes a good faith determination that the "inconveniences" of these alternatives outweigh the
not inconsiderable "inconveniences" of discharging employees, 180 there
is presumptively some real economic justification for the decision.
(2)

Theoretical Considerations

If the legal rights of the employer in the picket line situation were
construed in a manner consistent with the mainstream of federal labor
law, specific proof of "business necessity" in each individual situation
would not be required. The fact that such proof is now required exposes
the most critical deficiency of the present "business necessity" approach:
184. The reasoning used by the Board in achieving this "balance" is rather curious.
An oft-quoted passage from Overnite Transp. Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1271, 1274 (1965),
holds that "a mere showing that someone else may have to do the work" is insufficient
to counterbalance the employees' section 7 rights. But in so concluding the Board did
not really weigh the intrinsic inconvenience of this alteration of the business routine.
Rather, it reasoned that since "that fact (i.e. being forced to have someone else do the
work) is inherent in every situation where employees fail to perform a portion of their
assigned tasks by respecting a picket line," to accept this as an outweighing factor would
be to nullify the employees' rights altogether. In short, the Board simply assumes its
conclusion. If the "inconvenience" of being forced to have someone else do the work
is of substantial intrinsic weight, it should counterbalance the employees' alleged section
7 rights regardless of whether the factor is present in every case or not. Always finding
a "concerted activity for mutual aid" to be protected to at least some extent or under
at least some circumstances is not implicit in a proper balancing approach, as the Board
seems to assume. It is, rather, possible that once the balance is struck the conclusion
will be that the activity is not protected at all.
185. The trial examiner in Thurston implicitly recognized his limitations in this regard when he stated that it was not his proper "function to assess the relative importance
of the various aspects of Respondent's operation." Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 166
N.L.R.B. 862, 866 (1967).
186. Naturally, the discharged employee suffers the greatest "inconvenience." But
the discharge is not exactly "cost free" to the employer either; there is the intangible
"inconvenience" of a potentially damaged relationship between management and the
workforce, as well as the cost and "inconvenience" of hiring and training a replacement
for the discharged employee.
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it is predicated on a legally erroneous conception of the nature of the
relevant employer interests.
In giving specific meaning to the rather obscure provisions of the
Labor Act, such as section 7, the Board and the courts often engage
in the so-called process of balancing employee "rights" against the employer's "legitimate business interests." The relevant employer interests are, however, of two significantly different types. The first, for
want of a better term, shall be called the "concrete" employer interest.
This kind of interest is specific, tangible, and actually capable of proof
in particular situations. The other relevant type of employer interest
shall be denominated, again for want of a better term, "presumptive."
This kind of interest also represents something tangible, but it exists
independently as an abstraction or a "legal concept." It is an interest
of employers qua employers (or of property owners qua property
owners), and it is legally recognized even though in a particular fact
situation its referant may be incapable of proof or even non-existent.
These concepts can be best understood in the context of specific employee or union section 7 activities, against which the employer's interests are commonly balanced.
The two kinds of interests emerge most clearly in the context of
the law regulating the access of non-employee union organizers to the
employer's property. Under the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co.,187 recently reaffirmed in Central Hardware Co.
v. NLRB, 188 an employer may exclude non-employee union organizers
from his property so long as reasonably adequate alternative channels
of communication exist for the union access to the employees. The
Court justified this power of exclusion, not by reference to an
employer's specific interest in maintaining "production or discipline' 8 9
(a "concrete" interest), but rather by reference to the fifth amendment
right of private property 9 ° (a "presumptive" interest).
Thus, under Babcock & Wilcox an employer can exclude non-employee union organizers from his premises without the necessity of first
demonstrating some specific "need" for such exclusion; conversely,
proof of "no need" does not rebut his presumptive right to exclude
them.' 9 ' Rather, this first kind of Babcock & Wilcox interest can be
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
(1962),

351 U.S. 105 (1956).
407 U.S. 539 (1972).
351 U.S. at 113.
Id. at 112.
For example, in General Dynamics/Telecommunications, 137 N.L.R.B. 1725
the Board sustained the employer's exclusion of non-employee union organizers

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

overriden in only two ways: first, the right may be forfeited by the
employer's discriminatory exercise of his right.1""
It should be noted that the Babcock & Wilcox theory of exclusion
exactly parallels the Mackay striker-replacement doctrine under which
an employer has a "presumptive" interest in the continuation of the normal operation of his business, justifying the hiring of permanent
replacements. As in the Babcock & Wilcox context, this Mackay "presumptive" interest is not rebutted by a showing of "no actual need" in
any specific case. 0 ' It is, rather, subject only to the caveat that the
employer not exercise his right of replacement in a discriminatory manner.
Secondly, the Babcock & Wilcox "presumptive" interest will be
overriden if the union can demonstrate the absence of reasonably adequate alternative channels of communication. When such proof is made,
non-employee union organizers are entitled to enter the company property, but this access is still subject to such rules as may be necessary for
the maintenanceof productionand discipline. 94 That is, "concrete" employer interests will still operate to limit the scope of the union's access.
The law with respect to employee solicitation also reflects an analogous dichtomy of employer interests-the "concrete" and the "presumptive." It is now well established that the Labor Act.
does not prevent an employer from making and enforcing reasonable rules covering the conduct of employees on company time.
Working time is for work. It is therefore within the province of
an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union
solicitation during working hours. Such a rule must be presumed
to be valid in the absence of evidence that it was adopted for a discriminatory purpose.'0 5
from his property, in spite of the trial examiner's finding that this employer had no
"cogent reason" for denying the union access. Id. at 1726-27. The conclusion that
actual "need" is not a condition precedent to a lawful exclusion is also illustrated
by situations like Central Hardware, where the employer was allowed to exclude nonemployee union organizers from the parking lot of his retail store. That is, the law presumes that organizational activities by employees on their own time and in non-work
areas such as a parking lot does not interfere with any "concrete" interests of the employer in maintaining production or discipline; as a practical matter, the mere substitution of an off-duty employee by a non-employee union organizer does not alter that fact;
yet despite the continued absence of specific need, the non-employee can be excluded.

192. 351 U.S. at 112.
193. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
194. S & H Grossinger's, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 233, 261 (1965), enforced, 372 F.2d
26 (2d Cir. 1967); see Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 468 F.2d 252, 254 (8th Cir.
1972).
195. Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944), quoted with approval in Republic Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803-04 n.10 (1945).
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While employer rules against solicitation during work hours can
usually be justified by reference to the employer's "concrete" interest

in maintaining discipline and production,190 it is clear from the above
quotation that the Board originally sanctioned such rules on the basis
of the more abstract "presumptive" type of employer interest. That
is, the presumption of which the Board speaks does not relate to the
existence of the demonstrable need to maintain discipline and produc-

tion; the presumption, rather, relates directly to the validity of the rule
itself. And this presumption is rebutted, not by proof that in a partic-

ular work situation the rule is not actually necessary,19 7 but rather only
by proof of section 8(a)(3) discrimination in enactment or enforcement. From this it follows that an employer's right to promulgate a
no-solicitation rule is not dependent upon some "concrete" interest the
presence of which may be disproved; it is, rather, predicated on the

more abstract "presumptive" interest of an employer qua employer in
controlling the conduct of his employees on company time.
196. Accord, Note, No-Solicitation and No-Distribution Rules: Presumptive Validiity and Discrimination, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1049, 1051 (1964).
197. Contra, Daylin Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 81 L.R.R.M. 1145 (July 19, 1972),
enforced, 496 F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1974). In this case the Board held, three to two that
an overbroad no-solicitation rule is the equivalent of having no rule at all, and that in
the absence of a prior rule an employee cannot be disciplined even for soliciting during
work time. In dicta, however, the majority also dropped this bombshell:
The Chairman's dissent is based on a misconception of the statutory right
of employees to engage in union solicitation at their place of work. The Act
establishes and protects their right to so engage, even during working time,
so long as there is no interference with production. Only a substantial business justification, such as a genuine interference with the progress of the work,
justifies any restriction on this right of solicitation. A no-solicitation rule
is presumptively, and only presumptively, valid if it is limited to prohibiting
solicitation during the time an employee is expected to be working and not
during breaktime, lunchtime, or the like. Such a rule is valid because it is
presumed to be directed toward, and to have the effect of, preventing interference with production.
In a footnote, the majority then notes that:
Where it could be shown from the characteristics of the work that union solicitation during worktime would in no way interfere with performance of the
work, for example, Lil Abner's mattress-testing job, a no-soliciation rule of
any kind would be invalid.
Id. at 2 & n.2, 81 L.R.R.M. at 1146 & n.2.
While it is clear that a majority of the Board, speaking through dicta at least, now
construes the employer's interest in promulgating no-solicitation rules as being of a "conarete" rather than "presumptive" nature, it is equally clear that this marks a substantial
departure from the existing state of the law. The majority in Daylin cited no prior case
in which it was held or even argued that a no-solicitation rule, limited strictly to working
hours and not otherwise enacted or applied in a discriminatory manner, was illegal simply because of the absence of the "need" for the rule in terms of production or discipline; instead, they resort to an example drawn from the comic pages kingdom of Dogpatch. Although the court of appeals enforced the Board's order, its analysis was "cast
in terms of orthodox labor law," and it declined to pass upon any of the Board's novel
conceptions of the law.
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This particular type of "presumptive" employer interest needs no
elaborate justification. Just as the law does not impose a servitude
upon an employer's property in favor of non-employee union organizers,' 9" it likewise does not require that an employer subsidize his employees' union solicitation efforts. The norm that "working time is for
work' 99 simple reflects the ethical principle that the employer is entitled to receive the full productive efforts for which he has contracted
and for which he is compensating the employee. When, in the exercise of the normal prerogatives of management, the employer in good
faith determines that the requirements of the work preclude an employee from simultaneously engaging in solicitation efforts of any kind,
that decision should be respected by the law.200
While a prohibition against solicitation during working time is thus
justified in terms of the employer's "presumptive" interests, a prohibition against solicitation during non-working time requires proof that
"special circumstances make the rule necessary in order to maintain
production or discipline." '0 In other words, proof of a "concrete" employer interest is necessary to sustain the validity of such a no-solicitation rule.
It is clear from these examples that the law does recognize the
existence of the two types of employer interests. It is equally clear
that the employer's "presumptive" interest is the more weighty of the
two. This interest, having the nature of a "right," can be overridden
only if it has been abused by the employer, as in the case of a discriminatory application of an otherwise valid rule, or if there is a compelling
employee interest flowing from the core of the statute, such as the availability of information about the fundamental question of the merits
of unionization.
The question then becomes, what kind of employer interest is at
stake when an employee refuses to cross a picket line at another employer's premises? Beyond cavail, the "business necessity" test as cur198. NLRB v. Babcock &Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
199. Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944).
200. See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965)
("[Slome employer decisions are so peculiarly matters of management prerogative that
they would never constitute violations of § 8 (a) (1), whether or not they involved sound
business judgment, unless they also violated § 8 (a) (3).").
201. Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 844 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1006
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944); see NLRB v. May Dep't Stores Co., 154
F.2d 533 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 725 (1946) (upheld prohibition against offduty solicitation on the selling floors of a retail store because of the peculiar circumstances of the business).
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rently applied takes into account only the employer's "concrete"
interest-i.e. the same kind of interest that must be shown in order
to exclude non-employee union organizers who lack alternative channels of communication or to prohibit employee solicitation during nonwork time. It is submitted, however, that a "presumptive" employer
interest is also present in the picket line situation. Why this is so, as
well as the nature of this "presumptive" interest, can be established by
analogy.
The "presumptive" employer interest recognized by Babcock &
Wilcox is of little help. 2 2 The "presumptive" interest of the employer
in hiring permanent replacements for striking employees is somewhat
more promising. Indeed, the original "business necessity" test sprang
from the loins of this analogy. 20 3 This approach, however, has been
attended by considerable travai 2 04-and perhaps rightly so. It is a mistake to apply the analogy too literally. There are critical differences
between a striker and an employee who merely refuses to cross a
picket line. The weight of the employees' interest is certainly less in
the latter situation.20 5 The nature and weight of the employer's "presumptive" interest is also different. The employer's "presumptive!' interest in continuing the operation of the business is obviously present,
but there is something else as well.
This "something else" is reflected in the "presumptive" interest
that justifies the employer's prohibition of employee solicitation during
working time. The inherent nature of the employment relationship
gives an employer the right to control the work-time conduct of his employees. As recognized by the court of appeals in the Rockaway News
case, this same kind of "presumptive' interest precludes an employee
from exercising his section 7 rights "during his working time in violation
of his employer's working rules by refusing to perform that part of his
2 0° 6
regular duties which requires him to cross the picket line.
202. This is true because, among other reasons, the Supreme Court emphasized that
the employer's interests vis-a-vis his employees were different to those vis-4-vis non-employees. 351 U.S. at 112-13.
203. See Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1547, af 'd sub noam. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905
(1964); Rockaway News Supply Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 336, 337 (1951), rev'd, 197 F.2d 111
(2d Cir. 1952), aff'd, 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
204. See the Supreme Court's apparent rejection of the analogy in NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 75 (1953), but its subsequent resurrection in a somewhat abbreviated form, discussed in Part II supra.
205. This is discussed more fully in Parts IV B & D infra.
206. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d 111, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1952),
aff'd, 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
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In justifying the employer's conduct in Rockaway News, the court
of appeals also relied on the cases that sustain the employer's right to discharge employees who engage in so-called "partial strikes. ' 20 7 These
partial strike cases are relevant to the present discussion for three reasons. First, the underlying employer interest relied on in these cases
is of a "presumptive" nature. Second, the "presumptiveness" of this
interest partakes of both the right of the employer to continue the operation of his business and the related right to control the conduct of his
employees during their work time. Third, the partial strike situation
and the underlying "presumptive" employer interest are closely analogous to the observance of a picket line and to the employer interest
that should be given recognition in such a situation.
A partial strike has been defined as a concerted attempt by employees, while remaining at work, to bring economic pressure upon
their employer to accede to their demands by refusing to perform fully
the work assigned them-as by refusing to perform certain specified
tasks, or by engaging in a slowdown, or by stopping work intermittently.208 Employees who engage in such activities have consistently
been denied Labor Act protection against discharge. 0 0 The interest
of the employer in this situation is analogous to the interests that underlie the employer's rights to disallow solicitation during work time and
to hire permanent replacements for strikers. It is simply the interest
of an employer in having his employees perform the work assigned
them as an integral part of the continuation of the normal operations
of the business. Thus in a partial work stoppage context, it is irrelevant
that other employees or supervisors are available to do the work; it is irrelevant that permanent replacements were never hired; it is irrelevant
that the refused work constitutes but a small percentage of the refusing
employee's job assignment; it is irrelevant that other work could be assigned to this employee; it is irrelevant that the work he refuses to perform is lacking in "urgency" or "importance. '210 In short, it is irrelevant that the employer could take steps short of discharge to mediate
or otherwise defend against the injury to his "concrete" interests. 21 1
207. Id. at 114 n.5.
208. C. MoRRIs, supranote 6, at 531-32.
209. Id. This kind of activity by employees has been characterized as constituting
"a refusal on their part to accept the terms of employment set by their employer without
engaging in a stoppage, but to continue rather to work on their own terms." Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 337 (1950). As one court of appeals put it, "[wie are aware
of no law or logic that gives the employee the right to work upon terms prescribed
solely by him." C.G. Con, Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 F.2d 390, 397 (7th Cir. 1939).
210. See text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
211. See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1547, 1549-50 (1954).
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These are all irrelevant because the controlling interests are not "concrete" ones; they are, rather, "presumptive."
The same employer interests that the law recognizes in the partial
strike context are also present in the refusal-to-cross context. The conduct of employees in refusing to cross picket lines violates that interest
in exactly the same fashion. The interest is simply that which an employer has in having his employees perform the work assigned them
as an integral part of the continuation of the normal operations of the
business- a "presumptive" one. It is treated as such in the partial
strike context; it is entitled to be treated as such in the picket lines context.
While "presumptive" interests are entitled to great deference
under the law, the mere presence of such an interest is not conclusive
of the illegality of the employee or union conduct 'that interferes with
it. The balance must still be struck, and as Babcock & Wilcox illustrates, sometimes the interference will be deemed legitimate. 212 How,
in the picket line context, the inclusion of this "presumptive" employer
interest as a legitimate weight will affect the balance will be dealt with
later. 213 At this juncture the point is that the "business necessity" test
as currently applied does not even take cognizance of this "presumptive" interest; it constitutes no weight at all on the employer's side of
the scales. Thus, in the absence of interference with proven "concrete" interests, the balance automatically favors the employee activity.
This is not only inconsistent with the approach taken in analogous contexts, but is also representative of an excessive and unwarranted derogation of the fundamental right of an employer to manage his enterprise.
Adoption of the "presumptive" interest approach to the problem
of picket line observance assumes, of course, that an employee engages
in an activity generally encompassed by section 7 when he refuses to
cross a picket line at another employer's premises. It is to that assumption that we now turn.
B.

A Reconsideration of the "Mutual Benefits" That Inure to Picket
Line Observers
As was indicated earlier, an activity does not come within the am-

212. When the union lacks reasonably adequate alternative channels of communication, the interests of the employees in being able to hear the union's arguments in favor
of organization will outweigh the employer's "presumptive' interest in controlling access
to his property; see NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
213. See Part IV D infra.
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bit of section 7 protection unless it is both "concerted" (i.e. involves
more than one person) and for the "mutual benefit" of all the actors.
In the. context of an employee's refusal to cross a picket line at another
employer's premises, the refusing employee is literally acting "in concert" with the picketers; the presence of a "mutual benefit" is not so
obvious.
Two basic theories of "mutual benefit" have developed. The
first, characterized as the "neighborhood effects" theory, hypothesizes
that the enhanced benefits that inure to the picketing employees as
a result of their successful picket line will ultimately inure to the benefit of the honoring employees as a part of a generally rising level of
emplcyment benefits in the society as a whole. 214 The second, termed
the "reciprocity" theory, hypothesizes that by honoring another union's
picket line the honoring employee obtains implicit assurance that his
picket line will be honored when the time comes, thus enhancing 'the
efficacy of -his strike.2 15 The "reciprocity" theory does not, however,
envision a literal, one-to-one exchange of mutual promises of respect.
The theory is far more fictional than that. It hypothesizes a class-wide,
multi-party compact whereby worker A, 'by 'honoring the picket line of
worker B, thereby obtains -the assurance that all other workers will
honor A's picket line when the time comes.
Although the two theories differ, it is apparent that they are both
predicated on a concept of "worker class solidarity" and its concomitant
assumption that the success of a strike by one group of workers will
always, however indirectly, inure to the economic benefit of other
groups of workers. Economically, that assumption is patently false.
The success of a strike by one group of employees is rarely, if ever,
of any real long-term benefit to other employees as a group. Rather,
a strike resulting in a wage increase more often than not operates to
the immediate detriment of most other groups of workers-a detriment
which is at best neutralized by successful strikes of their own.
This is so because a wage increase is cognizable as an economic
"benefit" for section 7 purposes only if the increase is in terms of "real
wages." The term "real wages" simply means how much the money
wage will buy in goods and services.21 6 A "real wage" increase does
not occur if 'the money wage increase is cancelled2 17out by a rise in the
cost of the goods and services the worker must buy.
214. See text accompanying notes 19 & 24 supra.
215. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
216. L. REYNOLDS, LAOR EcQNOMICS AND LABOR RELATioNS 422 (1959).

217. Id.
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Over the years the "real wages" of the American worker, and the
accompanying standard of living, have constantly risen.21 The major
portion of the rise in "real wages" is attributable to the simultaneous

rise in marginal productivity.

19

The "real wage" increases that result

from such increased productivity inure to the worker as quickly and

surely under a free labor market system as it does under collectivized
labor market system. 2 0 Whatever additional "real wage" income that
inures to the worker by virtue of collectivized bargaining is thus not

only minimal, it also represents something other than gains in productivity. What it represents is merely a reallocation of wages within the

economy.22 '

The question then becomes, from whom is the income

reallocated, or more poignantly, at whose expense does the unionized

worker obtain "real wage" increases in excess of an increase in productivity?
In order to answer that question, one must recognize that the

wages employees receive are, from the employer's perspective, simply
a cost. If the employees' wage goes up without a corresponding rise

in productivity, this additional cost must come from either the employer's profits or from an increase in the price of an item. It is commonly believed that wage increases impinge mainly upon profits and
218. Id. at 426-30; E. SCHMIDT, supra note 6, at 43.
219. S. PETRO, THE LABOR POLICY OF THE FREE SocIErY 101 (1957); L. RYNoLDs,
supra note 216, at 429, 450-51; E. ScMmDT, supra note 6, at 43; cf. A. ALCmAN & W.
ALLEN, UNWmvsY ECONOMicS 428 (3d ed. 1972). The factors of production are labor
and capital (which includes land), and "productivity" may be defined in terms of the
number of outputs that a specified number of inputs (or factors of production) is capable
of producing, given the existing technology. The "marginal productivity" of a factor
of production relates to the number of additional outputs that can be produced as a result
of the addition of a single input. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 50, 535, 537-38 (9th
ed. 1973). Economist Murry N. Rothbard has had this to say about the so-called "productivity of labor."
inhere is danger in using a term such as "productivity of labor." Suppose,
for example, we state that "the productivity of labor has advanced in the last
century." The implication is that the cause of this increase came from within
labor itself, i.e., because current labor is more energetic or personally skillful
than previous labor. This, however, is not the case. An advancing capital
structure increases the marginal productivity of labor, because the labor supply
has increased less than the supply of capital goods. This increase in the marginal productivity of labor, however, is not due to some special improvement
in the labor energy expended. It is due to the increased supply of capital
goods. The causal agents of increased wage rates in an expanding economy,
then, are not primarily the workers themselves, but the capitalist-entrepreneurs
who have invested in capital goods. The workers are provided with more
and better tools, and so their labor becomes relatively scarcer as compared
to the other factors.
M. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE 519 (1970).
220. W. Hurr, supra note 2, at 21-22, 245-47; cf. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra
note 219, at 432-33; G. BACH, ECONOMICs, AN INTRODUCTION TO ANALYSIS AND POLICY
606-07 (1957); L. REYNOLDS, supra note 216, at 474.
221. W. HuTr, supra note 2, at 6-7; L. REYNoLDs, supra note 216, at 474.
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hence have no impact at all on prices. 222 But economists have consistently demonstrated the falsity of this belief. In the long run, an increase in labor costs always results in an increase in price rather than
a decrease in profits. 223 The increased price may come about as a
direct "pass-on" of the new labor costs; or where the competitive exigencies of a particular manufacturer do not allow the increased costs
to be absorbed by an increase in his prices, the result will be an ultimate
curtailment of his production, a reduced supply of the item in the market, and a consequent higher price for the item whoever manufactures
it. 24 In either event, in order to determine at whose expense the employees obtain their wage increase, it is necessary only to identify who
pays the price for the item. This, obviously, is the consumer-a class
which to an overwhelming extent includes those we have identified as
employees!
This chain of economic relationships has led economist Emerson
P. Schmidt to note that "while workers appear to be working for employers, they are, in fact, largely working for one another."'225 Put
more bluntly, the wage increase of employees in Industry A comes "at
the expense of" the employees in Industry B-in their role of consumer/employ. 22 6 Conversely, the employees in Industry B, as the
indirect "employers" of the employees in Industry A, have no logical
economic reason for wishing an increase in the wages of the Industry
A employees. To the contrary, as Industry A prices are increased to
reflect the higher wage cost, Industry B employees, as consumers of
the Industry A product, will experience an actual decrease in their
"real" income. Why then, would the employees of Industry B want
to support the picket line of the employees of Industry A?
At this juncture, the "neighborhood effects" and "reciprocity"
theories come galloping in to identify the "benefit" of such conduct.
222. E. SCHMIDT, supra note 6, at 92.
223. Id. at 92-93; cf. A. ALcHnAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 219, at 434; M. FRIEDMAN, CAPrrALISM AND FREEDOM 124 (1962); W. HurT, supra note 2, at 7; L. REYNOLDS, supra note 216, at 471.
224. See M. ROTHBARD, supra note 219, at 627.
225. E. SCHmDT, supra note 6, at 32.

226. Likewise, the increased price will usually result in a decreased demand, which
will then lead to the unemployment of some of the Industry A employees. Thus in Industry A the wages per worker may be higher, but the total amount of wages paid will
be lower. In this regard, the wage increase of those who retain employment comes "at
the expense of" those who are laid off. These laid off employees are then required to
compete for other jobs-in Industry B, for example-which has the effect of reducing
the wage rate for such jobs. Thus, directly and indirectly, the Industry B employees
suffer because of the Industry A wage increase. W. HuT, supra note 2, at 7, 133-34;
M. RoTnm, supranote 219, at 620-23.
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The theories presume that either by virtue of the pressure of generally
rising wages in the "neighborhood" or by virtue of the enhanced power
of Industry B employees' reciprocally respected picket line, Industry B

employees will be able to obtain a comparable increase.
By putting the two theories into the sequential context within
which they are expected to operate, it becomes obvious -that the result-

ing "benefit" to Industry B employees (i.e. those who set the chain in
motion by honoring the picket line of the Industry A employees) is of

a predominantly defensive nature. If the employees in Industry B are
able to obtain substantially the same wage increase as -the employees

in Industry A, this merely returns the parties to the parity they enjoyed
prior to their respective strikes. Vis-a-vis each other, they have enjoyed no "real" wage increase at all. Such increases are, as the late
Walter Reuther put it, paid for in the "wooden nickels of inflation."22 7
Carrying the economic realities one step further, in order for the

employees in one industry to obtain a "real" wage increase over and
above that which comes by virtue of increased productivity, it is necessary for them to obtain a money wage increase that is relatively
greater than the money wage increase obtained by other employees in
the economy.2

-8

The potential in this regard is maximized when, for

example, the strike of the Industry A employees fails, but the strike
227. E. SCHMIDT, supra note 6, at 43. It may still be argued, however, that the employees in both Industries A and B (which in our model constitute all the employees in
the economy) enjoy a "real" wage increase at the expense of non-employee members
of the consumer class-those who derive their income from rent and interest payments.
While there is apparently some validity to the assertion, the real gain that this represents
has been characterized as "slight." L. REYNOLDS, supra note 219, at 471. Statistics,
rather, show that "labor's share" of the national wealth has for the most part remained
proportionately the same for many years. W. HUTr, supra note 2, at 216-36. Finally,
changing the model slightly, it is possible that the employees in Industries A and B (who
will now constitute only all of the unionized employees in the economy) may together
enjoy a "real" wage increase at the expense of non-unionzed employee members of the
consumer class, i.e. those who are unlikely to strike for higher wages and thus maintain
the parity by that means. See H. HAzuTT, THE CONQUEST OF POVERTY 134 (1973);
S. PETRO, supra note 219, at 116-17. If this exploitation of non-unionized employees
provides the "benefit" which makes picket line observance a protected concerted activity,
that fact should be made explicit and its policy implications considered in full. See F.
HAYEK, THE CONSrTIUTION OF LmERTY 267-84 (Gateway ed. 1960); H. HAzLrrT, supra,
at 131-42. Other studies, however, have demonstrated that the ratio between union and
non-union wages has remained fairly constant over the years. W. HUTn', supra at 245.
This is because inflation-contributed to, at least, by wage increases in unionized industries-makes it possible and profitable for employees to bid up the money price of labor
even in non-unionized industries. W. HURT, supra at 247.
228. Thirty years ago a leading member of the British Labor Party, Lady Barbara
Wootton recognized that the economic interests of a specific group of unionized employees are necessarily parochial. She noted that it is "the business of a union to be antisocial; the members would have a just grievance if their officials and committees ceased
to put sectional interests first." B. WOOTTON, FREDoM UNDER PLANNING 97 (1945).
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of the Industry B employees is successful; -the Industry B employees
will have then enjoyed a "real wage" increase, albeit at the expense
of Industry A employees. It is thus to the economic benefit of the Industry B employees that they cross-ratherthan 7efuse to cross- the
picket line of the Industry A employees and, to some extent at least,
thus render that picket line ineffective.
While the model hypothesized abovo is an over-simplified accounting of a complex reality, 229 it is sufficiently accurate to rebut the
equally simplistic notion of the economic solidarity of wage earners as
a class. "Working class solidarity" is at best a political slogan,2 30 not
a viable economic theory. And with the myth of worker solidarity also
falls the presumption that the success of the strike of one group of wage
earners will a fortiori inure to the benefit of all other groups of wage
earners. And since both the "neighborhood effects" and "reciprocity"
theories of "benefit" are predicated on that false assumption, the
theories themselves are also to that extent false.
In short, the Board and the courts are not justified in assuming
that a benefit will automatically inure when one employee honors the
picket line of another group of employees. This, however, still leaves
the possibility that in certain specific situations, such a benefit may be
provable under more 'modest versions of either a "reciprocity" or
"neighborhood effects" form of analysis. Where two groups of employees regularly go into the work environment of each other-i.e.
where there is proof of an actual potentiality for the literal reciprocal
honoring of picket lines-such mutual picket line observance may give
both groups enhanced bargaining strength that enables them to obtain
a wage increase which, at least on a short-term basis, is disproportionate
to the increases obtained by other workers in the economy and which,
thus, is at the expense of those other workers.
Likewise, while a "neighborhood" encompassing the entire workig class may be economically unrealistic, a limited number of employee groups may have sufficient "community of interest" to validate
the "neighborhood effects" theory. For example, when -there has been
a demonstrable historical parity between the wages of the strikers, on
229. See also H. HAzLrrT, supra note 227, at 135-36.
230. Indeed, Judge Hand's original articulation of the "reciprocity" theory in NLRB
v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1942), has
an obvious flavor of ideological polemics about it. His talk in terms of employee qua
employee "solidarity" and of making "the enemy of one the enemy of all" is certainly
more suggestive of a tract on class warfare than it is of an interpretation of the Wagner
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
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the one hand, and the wages of the potential honorer of -the strikers'
picket line, on the other, the joint wage increase that both will enjoy
as a result of the success of the strike may again qualify as a "benefit"
for section 7 purposes.
The point, however, is that when these specific situations exist, they
should be the subject of proof-i.e. proof that the picket line observer
does reasonably stand to obtain a concrete economic benefit by virtue
of his act. 2 3' Even assuming that in certain situations such proof can
be advanced, this still does not automatically entitle picket line observance to full section 7 protection. One must also confront the problem
of motive, and even after all the threshold issues have been dealt with,
there remains the ultimate balance which must 'be struck between the
employees' and the employer's interests.
C.

Fear-inspired Picket Line Observance as a Protected Concerted
Activity

When an employee's observance of a picket line is motivated, not
by principle or the hope of economic gain, but rather by a fear of physical retaliation from the pickets if their line is crossed, a question arises
as to whether this employee has actually engaged in a concerted activity
for mutual aid or protection. This issue arose in Overnite IV where
the administrative law judge held that the employees'2 32 sole reason for
observing the picket line was physical fear. The judge found much
merit in the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in NLRB v. Union Carbide
Corp.,233 which involved a picket line around the employer of an
employee who refused to cross out of fear. The Fourth Circuit had
held that "[o]ne who refuses to cross a picket line by reason of physical
fear does not act on principle. He makes no common cause, and contributes nothing to mutual aid or protection in the collective process. 2 34
231. This, of course, raises again the possibility of the kind of fact-specific rule of
law that was decried earlier in conjunction with the "business necessity" test. This difficulty, however, is obviated by the conclusion of this article-that even assuming the
presence of a "benefit" in certain picket line observance situations, the benefit is too

remote and the injury to the employer too great to bring the activity within the ambit
of section 7 protection.

232. Ovemite Transp. Co., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 84, at 11 (July 23, 1974) (administrative law judge's decision).
233. 440 F.2d 54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971). Subsequently, in
Virginia Stage Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 1971), the Fourth Circuit
arguably limited the Union Carbide doctrine to situations where fear is the sole motive.
See id. at 502 n.3. The dissent, however, read the decision as an unfortunate and erroneous repudiation of Union Carbide. But the Sixth Circuit has since cited Union Carbide with approval on this issue. Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir. 1972).

234. 440 F.2d at 56.
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The Board, however, has declined to follow the Fourth Circuit,'
and in Overnite IV the administrative law judge felt constrained to adhere to the Board's position. He thus held that the employees' conduct
was not unprotected simply because the underlying motive was fear
rather than principle. The Board in Overnite IV expressly disassociated itself from the administrative law judge's favorable remarks abort
Union Carbide.2"'
While the introduction of motive as a relevant consideration raises
287
some difficult but not insurmountable evidentiary and legal problems,
the Fourth Circuit is nevertheless correct in treating conduct caused
by coercion as being without the ambit of section 7. The Board's position to the contrary is not based on the belief that fear is necessarily
a motive cognizable by section 7; rather, the Board believes that motive
is simply irrelevant. In Cooper Thermometer the Board stated that
"the focal point of inquiry in determining whether. . . refusal to cross
the picket line . . . was a protected activity must of course be the nature of the activity itself rather than the employees' motives for engaging in the activity."2 8
One commentator has explained this as meaning that in a section
7 case the Board should focus only on the economic considerations. 2 0
If the activity benefits all of the actors in a way Congress envisioned,
then it is a concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, and nothing
more is relevant. Thus, of the Union Carbide case, this comment~gor
said,
The evidence supports a finding that, regardless of the motivation
for so doing, a refusal to cross would have confronted the employer
with an impressive showing of solidarity, and thus would have
contributed to the collective bargaining position of the strikers and
raised a likelihood of mutual aid being240extended to the refuser's
union if the situation were ever reversed.
In short, because the observance of the picket line would increase
the power of the striking union, to the supposed benefit of both its
members and the observers, such observance is to be a concerted activity for mutual aid and protection. This, of course, is the usual rationale for protecting picket line observance. But what the above writer
235.
1972).
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See Congoleum Indus., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 80 L.R.R.M. 1675 (June 15,
212 N.L.R.B. No. 84 at 5 n.6, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1122 n.6.

See Note, 17 VILL. L. REv. 179 (1971).
Cooper Thermometer, 154 N.L.R.B. 502 (1965).
Note, 17 ViLL. L. REv., supra note 237, at 185.
Id. at 186.
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fails to recognize is that -the application of the rationale in -the Union
Carbide context necessarily carries with it an implied condonation of
picket line violence. That is, the increase in power and benefits, which
the above writer uses as the justification for making the Union Carbide
employees' observance of the picket line a protected activity, inures
solely as the result of threats of physical violence!
That Congress intended to enhance the collective bargaining
power of unions cannot be denied; but it is incredible to suggest that
Congress intended for any segment of that power to be obtained by
means of physical threats and intimidation. Clearly, the consequent
enhancement of economic power that inures when coercion is used cannot justify the coercion itself as a protected section 7 activity. Likewise, it cannot justify the participation of the coerced as a protected
section 7 activity, for to treat it as such provides indirect but certain
encouragement to coercion. That is, when an employer is prohibited
by federal law from replacing an individual who can be intimidated with
an individual who cannot, the picketers will retain their fil-gotten economic gains, regardless of what other legal sanctions might, per chance,
be brought against them.
That the hapless employee in these cases is caught in the cross
fire-perhaps literally-is certainly unfortunate. The remedy, however, is not a further penalization of the employer in the exercise of
his common law rights. The answer, rather, must be to remove the
source of the problem-picket line violence. Remedies are available
under both state and federal law;241 the problem lies in the failure of
the authorities to take an aggressive stand against picket line intimidation. For too long there has been a tendency on the part of law enforcement officials simply to accept a certain amount of physical coercion as an integral, though unfo4unate, incident of all picketing
activity. 242 This, of course, constitutes a breach of that obligation of
government which also serves as the philosophical justification for the
State's existence-the obligation of insuring that one citizen never initiates physical coercion against another. It is a breach which must be
brought to an immediate end.
241. See note 6 supra.

242. See Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208, 1211 (1961), modified, 137
N.L.R.B. 1545, aff'd sub nom. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964); S. Pamo, supra note 5, at 234-38. The socalled "Thayer Doctrine," whereby the Board in determining the appropriateness of the
reinstatement of discharged employees balances the employees' strike "misconduct"
against the employer's unfair labor practices, also reflects a certain toleration of picket
line violence. See Local 833, UAW v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 836 (1962).
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In any event, if for no other reason, the Board was wrong in Overnite IV in finding that one of the employees who honored the picket
line out of fear had engaged in a protected concerted activity.
Assuming, however, that fear is not the motivation and that some
tangible economic benefit will inure to the employee who honors a
picket line at some other place of business, we then come to the next
step in the analysis-balancing the employees' interest in engaging in
this particular kind of concerted activity against the employer's previously discussed interests in continuing the normal operation of his business. It is to that balance that we will now turn.
D. The TheoreticalFramework for a Section 7 Analysis
An activity is not entitled to full or even partial protection against
employer reprisal merely because an employee activity is both "concerted" and of "mutual benefit. '243 The identification of activity entitled to protection (and more particularly, against what) has been a
rather difficult task for the Board and the courts. The balancing test
mentioned above obviously entails something more objective than
merely cataloging what the parties have to "gain!' or "lose" from the
section 7 determination. Rather, the specific interests of the parties
must first be translated, where possible, into interests protected by the
statute, and the balance then struck between the two competing statutory considerations.
Although this is a rather high level generalization, much of the
section 7 case law can be explained by reference to the following
axiom: the extent to which an activity is protected should be determined by reference to two factors-the first being the "immediacy" of
the objectives of the activity to the employment relationship of the employee and his employer, and the second being the "coerciveness" of
the activity vis-h-vis the employer. These factors operate to provide
a sliding scale of "protectedness": the more immediate the objective,
the more coercive the allowable activity, and conversely the more remote the object, the less coercive 'the activity must be to remain protected.
The first factor, measuring the immediacy of the objectives to the
employment relationship, is, in part, an internal elaboration of the
243. "[B]oth the Board and the courts have recognized that not every form of activity that falls within the letter of this provision is protected." Elk Lumber Co., 91
N.L.R.B. 333, 336-37 (1950).
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"mutual benefit" element discussed above. It recognizes that some of
the "benefits" contemplated by section 7 are more immediate to the

employment relationship than others.

"Wages, hours and other terms

and conditions of employment"-mandatory subjects of collective bargaining-are the most immediate of benefits from a section 7 perspective. When these matters are at issue, the law allows maximum resort
to economic force-the strike.

The permissible objectives of section 7 activity are, however,
broader than the category of mandatory bargaining subjects.

Some

matters, though not a mandatory subject of bargaining, may "bear such
a reasonable connection to matters affecting the interests of employees
qua employees, as to come within the general reach of the 'mutual aid

and protection' the statute is concerned to protect. ' 244 With respect
to such matters, however, the types of activity that the union can engage in vis-h.-vis injury to the employer are proportionately restricted.
Thus, the hiring of foremen or cashiers may generally constitute per-

missible objects of section 7 activity because of the impact these matters
have on the employees' working conditions, but the activities that have
been sanctioned with respect to these objects have consistently been

of a non-coercive nature.245
Another element that is relevant to the immediacy factor is the
degree of control the employer has over the objective sought. In G
& W Electric Specialty Co. v. NLRB2 46 the court of appeals expressly
noted that the objective of the coercive employee concerted activity

"did not concern a matter over which the Company had control."24 '
Thus, although the objective of the activity was very broadly within the
244. G & W Elec. Specialty Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1136 (1965), rev'd, 360 F.2d 873
(7th Cir. 1966). Although the Board was reversed on appeal, the court did not necessarily reject the thesis that the permissible objects of section 7 activity are broader than
mere mandatory subjects of bargaining; rather, the court merely held that the object of
the activity in question exceeded an even further boundary in that it was beyond the
"control" of the employer. 360 F.2d at 876.
245. See, e.g., NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op, Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 13 (6th
Cir. 1960) (non-coercive protest over the hiring of a particular foreman held to be a
protected activity; court distinguished prior case which "held that activities in protest
over appointment of a foreman did not constitute concerted activity for the reason that
the Act does not protect activities during working hours which disturb the efficient operation of the employer's business."); NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d
983 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948) (non-coercive protest over the identity and capability of a new cashier held to be protected activity); Getman, supra note
8, at 1215 (with respect to non-mandatory matters, "employees are protected in stating
their position but not in exerting economic pressure").
246. 360 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1966).
247. Id. at 876.
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"range of possible employee mutual interests,"2 48 the court held that
it was not protected under section 7. This makes much sense. Coercive employee activity, which has as its objective something over
which the employer has no control, puts the employer in an unconscionable dilemma.249 The "secondary boycott" provisions of the statute affirmatively outlaw some conduct of this type.
More specifically, the
"control" factor has been repeatedly emphasized by the Board as a criteria for distinguishing between primary and secondary objectives. 1
A final aspect of immediacy is the directness of the nexus between
the activity in question and its stated objective. At some point the
"cause and effect" relationship between an activity and the alleged objective becomes so tenuous and remote as to disqualify the activity from
section 7 protection no matter how closely the objective is related to
the employment relationship.25 2
The second factor- the coerciveness of the activity- is also a
somewhat complex concept. In the most generalized sense, "coercive"
simply means an interference with either an employer's "concrete"
and/or his "presumptive" interests. The invasion of "presumptive" interests, 253 since they represent rights normally protected at common
law, is in legal contemplation the most coercive form of employee activity. Conversely, concerted employee activity which constitutes only
an invasion of purely "concrete" interests is the least coercive. Previously, the Mackay striker-replacement doctrine was described in
terms of the employer's "presumptive" interest, but when the situation
is viewed as a whole, it is apparent that purely "concrete" interests are
at stake as well and that the law has responded accordingly. While
the refusal of existing employees to continue work frequently inflicts
great economic injury upon an employer, in the absence of contract,
an employer does not have the right to their continued employment.
248. Id. at 877.
249. The legislative history suggests, for example, that labor legislation would generally be deemed a permissible section 7 objective, and that the appearance of employee
representatives before legislative committees would be a protected form of activity. See
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 930, 937 (1st Cir. 1940); Walker Process Equip., Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. 615, 621 n.5 (1967). But since the passage of labor legislation is beyond any employer's total control, section 7 should certainly not be construed as extending protection to a "national strike" designed to promote the passage of
the legislation.
250. Labor-Management Relations Act, § 8(b) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1970).
251. See, e.g., George Koch Sons, Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 82 L.R.R.M. 1113 (Jan.
5, 1973), affd, 490 F.2d 323 (4th Cir. 1973).
252. Cf. Hunt Tool Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 145, 146 (1971).
253. See text accompanying note 194 supra.

1974]

PICKET LINES

Thus, the concerted activity of the strike itself represents an invasion
of a "concrete" but not a "presumptive" employer interest. Consequently, the law does not allow the employer the response of discharge.
On the other hand, an employer does have the right to attempt to continue -the normal operation of his business; this is a "presumptive" interest which the law recognizes by allowing the employment of permanent xeplacements.
The apparent anomaly of protecting from discharge employees
who engage in a total strike but not those who merely engage in a partial strike can be resolved when viewed from the above perspective.
A partial strike certainly involves an interference with the employer's
"concrete" interest, but as was established earlier, 254 this conduct also
involves an invasion of an important "presumptive" interest. The partial strike is, thus, in legal contemplation more, "coercive" than the
strike itself. It is accordingly entitled to less protection by the law. Indeed, from the perspective of the sliding scale mentioned above, the
coerciveness of the partial strike is so extreme that it is unprotected
255
even when the objective is a very immediate, economic one.
The balance that the law achieves between "immediacy" and "coerciveness" can be seen rather clearly with respect to employee concerted activity of the so-called "sympathetic" variety. In this situation the objective of the activity is the wages, hours and working conditions of the employees of another employer. The law takes a generally
dim view of -this as an object of union activity. The wages, hours and
working conditions of other employees is a patently non-mandatory subject of bargaining between a stranger union and employer; 5 6 it would
be affirmatively illegal for that union to condition agreement over mnandatory matters upon satisfactory resolution of such non-mandatory matters.2 57 Likewise, if a union seeking to obtain higher wages for the
employees of one company calls a strike among the employees of a
supplier of that company, this would normally be considered illegal
secondary conduct.258 If a union and an employer enter into an ar254. See text accompanying notes 206-12 supra.
255. See, e.g., Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950); C. Momus, supra note 6,
at 531-32 ("The Board has found such activity devoid of section 7 protection... however lawful the economic objective may have been.").
256. Cf. Chemical Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157
(1971). The Court indicated that even if retirees were considered "employees" for the
purposes of the Act, they would not be appropriate members of the unit for which the
union bargained; their benefits would, therefore, not be considered a mandatory subject
of bargaining between the employer and that union.
257. NLRB v. Wooster Div., 356 U.S. 342 (1958)-.
258. Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(b) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1970).
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rangement whereby they can determine the wages of the employees
of another employer, anti-trust laws are violated.2"'
Even if conduct having this objective (i.e. the wages, hours and
working conditions of other employees) is not to be considered affirmatively illegal, it is nevertheless entitled to scant protection from a section 7 perspective. As an objective generally cognizable by section 7,
the wages, hours and working conditions of the employees of other employers will at most justify concerted activity of a highly non-coercive
nature. The collection of funds, at appropriate times and places, by
one group of employees to support another group of striking employees
would, for example, constitute a form of non-coercive concerted
activity. Assuming the presence of some actual "benefit" to the collecting employees, this would normally be protected under the Labor
Act.260 More coercive forms of conduct-for example, collecting funds
during working time, in violation of the employer's "presumptive" interests-would not, however, be entitled to section 7 protection.
E. An Application of the Theory to Employee Observance of Picket
Lines at Another Employer'sPremises
It should not be too difficult to see where a refusal to cross a
picket line at another employer's premises rests on the sliding scale of
protectedness hypothesized above.
When an employee refuses .to cross a picket line at another employer's premises, an objective-if the activity is to fall within section
7 at all-must necessarily be the ultimate enhancement of his own
wages, hours, or other working conditions. These are clearly mandatory
subjects of bargaining; but the achievement of this objective by virtue
of the activity in question is so remote and improbable as to amount
to a virtual fiction. The nexus between the activity and the alleged
benefit is especially tenuous and circuitous under the "reciprocity
among the entire working class" theory, which assumes that the strikers
themselves will usually 'have no opportunity to reciprocate with each
specific picket line honorer. By honoring a picket line under these circumstances, the most that a worker can expect is that his act will rein259. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). "[M]e think a union forfeits its
exemption from the anti-trust laws when it is clearly shown that it has agreed with one
set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units." Id. at 665.
260. General Elec. Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 1101 (1968), enforced, 411 F.2d 750 (9th
Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (held that such activity for such an objective was protected
by section 7).
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force that tenet of "union morality"2 61 and that his own picket line will
be respected by some other worker when the time comes. That, obviously, is stretching "cause and effect" rather far. Even under a literal,
one-to-one theory of reciprocity, the flow of benefits is fairly problematical, since the efficacy of the picket line against the formerly striking
employees is but one possibly insignificant factor relating to the former
honorers' ability to obtain their own struck-for wage increase.
The nexus between the activity of picket line observance and its
alleged benefits is equally remote under the "neighborhood effects"
theory, broadly construed. The wage rates generally prevailing within
an area of labor competition is obviously one relevant factor in determining a specific wage rate in a single plant within that area; but there
are many other factors as well.
Perhaps the least tenuous nexus between the act and -the benefits
of the act is that which exists under the "neighborhood effects" theory,
narrowly construed-as where one plant serves as the wage leader for
other plants in the area. But here the objection is not so much -the
indirection of the flow of benefits; the objection, rather, is the nature
of the channel through which the benefit flows (and this objection is
also applicable to the other "benefit" theories mentioned above). Assuming that the ultimate objective of picket line observance is the
wages, hours and working conditions of the picket line observer, one
-must nevertheless take cognizance of -the nature of the proximate and
intermediate objective of the activity.
In the picket line observance context, since the flow of benefits
envisioned by any of the theories necessarily entails the success of
someone else's strike, one can say that the proximate objective of the
activity is the wages, hours and working conditions of the employees
of another employer. As was demonstrated earlier, 26 2 as an objective
cognizable by section 7, that objective will at most justify concerted activity of a non-coercive nature. The refusal of an employee in the
course of his employment to cross a picket line at another employer's
premises, however, does not qualify as non-coercive. Like the partial
strike, a refusal to cross a picket line constitutes a highly coercive invasion of the employer's "presumptive" interest in having his employees
part of the continuation
perform the work assigned them as an 2integral
63
business.
the
of
operations
of the normal
261. See note 3 supra.
262. See text accompanying notes 243-45 supra.
263. See text accompanying notes 206-12 supra.
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It would thus appear, first, that while the ultimate objective of
picket line observance is to enhance the wages, hours and working conditions of the honorer, this objective is not only extremely remote from
the activity in question, but it is also achieved by means of a more proximate objective which is disfavored by the law. Second, observance of
a picket line during -the course of an employee's normal duties involves
conduct that in analogous contexts has been deemed so coercive as to
deprive the action of all section 7 protection whatsoever. There is, in
other words, no question where picket line observance falls on the sliding scale of protectedness articulated above. On the basis of that scale,
the activity should be deemed totally unprotected.
V.

SUMMARY

With respect to the section 7 protectedness of picket line observance, I previously stated what I thought "the law" to be on that subject.
The precedential quality of that statement of "the law" decreases,
however, the higher the issue goes on the adjudicatory pyramid-from
an administrative law judge, to the Board, to a court of appeals, to the
Supreme Court. An administrative law judge would be ill-disposed to
deviate substantially from that statement of "the law." It would not
be inconsistent with its function for the Board to reassess -the law in
this area. Mr. Justice Frankfurter once noted
that law is civilized to the extent that it is purposefully conscious.
Conversely, if law just "grow'd" like Topsey, unreflectively and
without conscious design, it is irrational. When it appears that a
challenged doctrine has been uncritically accepted as a matter of
course by the inertia of repetition-has just "grow'd" like Topsy
-the

Court owes it to the demands of reason . . . to reexamine

its foundations and validity .... 264
This adequately describes the evolution of the law of picket line observance, and prescribes the appropriate remedy for the present Board to
follow. The above described statement of "the law" is even less binding on the courts of appeal. Over the years they have taken an assortment of postures on picket line observance, but only one circuit has
adopted with any degree of unequivocality the statement of "the law"
articulated above.265 In that forum, the issue should still be considered
an open one. Finally, twenty years ago the Supreme Court expressly
264. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
265. NLRB v. Alamo Express, Inc., 430 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1021 (1971).
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declined to declare -any "sweeping abstract principles as to the respective rights of employer and employee regarding picket lines."2 66 The
Court has not touched the issue since.
In short, this is an area in which the law that "ought to be" can
easily become the law that "is." One can only hope that it does.
266. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 75 (1953).

